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This  issue of the Department W.P. reproduces two lectures by Professor Loasby 
organized by the CISEPS (Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, 
Psychology and the Social Sciences at Bicocca) in collaboration with the IEP, the 
Istituto di Economia Politica of the Bocconi University in Milan.  The  first lecture was 
delivered at the University of Milano-Bicocca on 13 October 2003 and the second was 
staged the day after at the Bocconi University.   The lectures are reproduced here 
together with a comment by dr. Stefano Brusoni of Bocconi and SPRU. 
Two further comments were presented at the time by Professor Richard Arena of the 
University of Nice and by  Professor Pier Luigi Sacco of the University of Venice.  
Both of them deserve gratitude for  active participation to the initiative. Unfortunately it 
has not been possible to include their comments in the printed form. 
In these lectures  Brian Loasby  opens under the title of  Psychology of Wealth  (a title 
echoing a famous essay by Carlo Cattaneo)  and he develops an argument in cognitive 
economics which is based on Hayek’s theory of the human mind with significant 
complements and extensions, mainly  from Smith and Marshall. The second lecture 
provides a discussion on organization and the human mind.  It can be read 
independently although it is linked to the former.  Indeed, in Professor Loasby’s words, 
“the psychology of wealth leads to a particular perspective on this problem of 
organization”.  The gist of the argument lies in the need to appreciate the significance of 
an appropriate “balance between apparently conflicting principles: the coherence, and 
therefore the effectiveness, of this differentiated system requires some degree of 
compatibility between its elements, but the creation of differentiated knowledge and 
skills depends on the freedom to make idiosyncratic patterns by thinking and acting in 
ways which may be radically different from those of many other people”. This dilemma 
of compatibility vs. independence can find solution in a variety of contexts, as Loasby’s 
analysis shows. 
In his comments Richard Arena had  focussed on the rationality issues,  so prominent in 
Loasby’s text.  For example, he had suggested that the cleavage between rational choice 
equilibrium and evolutionary order offers ground to new forms of self-organization.  
Pier Luigi Sacco had emphasized that Loasby’s approach breaks new ground on the 
economics of culture and paves the way to less simplistic conceptions of endogenous 
growth than is suggested by the conventional wisdom of current models. Unfortunately, 
as  hinted above, is has proved impossible to include those comments in the present 
booklet along with Loasby’s lectures.   A special obligation must be recorded to Dr. 
Stefano Brusoni, who has prepared a written version of his own comment which has 
been printed in this booklet and can be offered to the reader.  Among other participants 
Roberto Scazzieri, of the University of  Bologna, Tiziano Raffaelli, of the University of 
Pisa, Luigino   Bruni of Bicocca, Riccardo Cappellin of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’ and others  
were able to offer significant comments during the two sessions of the initiative. 
The  organizers are particularly grateful to Professor Brian Loasby for the active and 
generous support of the initiative.   Together with our colleagues and students we have 
been able to admire his enthusiasm and intellectual creativity in treating some of the 
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WEALTH 
 
 







Cattaneo’s Agenda for Economics 
 
My title is taken directly from the opening of ‘Del Pensiero come Principia d’Economia 
Publica’ by Carlo Cattaneo (2001 [1861]); and there is nowhere more appropriate than Milan for a 
celebration of his work, which has recently been republished together with an English translation. 
For this audience the presentation of Cattaneo’s argument in his essay of 1861 is probably 
superfluous – except in providing a stimulus to a discussion and development of his ideas in this 
session; but Cattaneo is not, I believe, at all well known outside Italy, and so some publicity may be 
as useful as it is deserved. 
 
Cattaneo’s purpose was to advocate a fundamental reorientation of economic study. 
Hitherto, he observed, scholars had successively investigated the contribution to production of 
natural resources, the work of man (especially as rendered more effective by the consequences of 
the division of labour), and capital. This analysis Cattaneo described as the physics of wealth; but 
he noted (as has since been regularly rediscovered) that even if these productive forces were equally 
available across nations, output could nevertheless differ substantially between them. These 
differences in productivity he attributed to differences in the application of intelligence and will. It 
was therefore time for scholars to devote themselves to this new step – to refocus from the physics 
to the psychology of wealth (p. 49). 
 
It is a depressing commentary on the history of economics, and a salutary reminder of the 
importance of the ways in which economists have applied their   intelligence and will to their own 
subject, that the call for such a reorientation is still appropriate today – not, I am sure, for this 
audience, but in relation to the bulk of work in economics, which still seeks to deduce outcomes 
directly from convenient specifications of the productive forces of land, labour and capital, and to 
cope with the repeated discovery that apparently similar productive forces can produce very 
different results by redefining them. ‘Human capital’ is a very good example, and particularly 
apposite to this session: it is treated as an augmentation of capital, but the particular ways in which 
it affects the productive process and the outputs delivered by this process are left out of focus. In 
particular, no attention is paid to the role of intelligence or will either in the process of decision-
making or in the conduct of productive activities. To do so would call into question the analytical 
reliance on ‘rationality’, either in the instrumental sense of a precise means-ends relationship or in 
the now-dominant methodological sense of internal consistency.  
 
Of course, this characterisation of economics does not apply to everyone, either now or in 
the 140 years since Cattaneo’s essay was published; and in this paper and again tomorrow I shall be 
relying on the work of some extremely distinguished economists, none of whom, as far as I know, 
drew direct inspiration from him. Cattaneo (pp. 51-3) argues that the reorientation which he is 
advocating entails a relatively small transition from the work of Genovesi and Adam Smith, whose 
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recognition of the means by which the division of labour generates improved skills and better 
practice brings one to the borderline between physics and psychology. However, in observing that 
Genovesi and Smith were particularly well equipped to cross that borderline because both were 
philosophers with interests in psychology (which was a familiar combination in their time), he 
seems to recognise the difficulty of doing so. Why they failed, he suggests, was because they were 
diverted in another direction by their realisation that increased productivity facilitated the 
accumulation of capital stocks, which were themselves important contributors to greater output, and 
by their perception that this relationship was amenable to analysis. The potential for capital 
formation is the basis of Smith’s distinction between productive and unproductive labour, which 
leaves ‘the scholar’ on the wrong side, despite the key role that he assigned to ‘philosophers and 
men of speculation’ in the discovery of new means of production. As Cattaneo observes (p. 51), 
every point of view has its limits; every application of intelligence imposes opportunity costs – 
including applications within economics. That apparently straightforward applications may not be 
noticed because people are looking in another direction will be a recurrent theme in these two 
presentations.  
 
It is precisely the opportunity cost of intelligence (or, more generally, of any application of 
human cognitive powers) that is missing from standard economics. Information may be costly, but 
everyone knows how to interpret it – including the information that has been rationally forgone. 
Thus Cattaneo’s (p. 59) proposition ‘There is no work, no capital which does not start with some act 
of intelligence’ is no more than a platitude in a conventional context; for if all actions are rationally 
chosen then ‘intelligence’, like ‘utility’, has no analytical content. The related proposition, cited 
from Rusconi, that ‘The value of things does not reveal itself on its own. It is the mind of man that 
discovers it’ is in this context, at best, a casual explanation of how the postulated set of goods, and 
the postulated preference functions applied to them, might have come into existence: causation is 
outside the scope of standard economics, having been displaced by consistency. (Giocoli (2003) has 
provided a treatment that is scholarly and incisive.) Menger, however, sought to develop a causal 
system of economic reasoning, and the foundation of this system is the discovery of how to make 
something useful as a means, direct or indirect, of satisfying human wants. This may be considered 
a direct, if unconscious, application of Cattaneo’s theme of intelligence and will. However, this 
application has tended to become submerged within the ‘Austrian’ theme of subjectivity, which 
could have provided a welcoming environment, because Austrians have usually been looking in 
another direction.  
 
Adam Smith had already identified the development of productive knowledge and skills as 
the prime route to increased productivity; and he would not have demurred from Cattaneo’s (p. 65) 
claim that ‘intelligence addresses itself to needs of a mental nature’, or indeed to the classification 
of pomp and vanity (as well as the desire for ‘connecting principles’ that soothe the imagination) as 
products of the human mind. That ‘the authority of tradition’ could inhibit the further development 
of ideas, and therefore the growth of wealth (p. 67), is also a theme that Smith and Cattaneo share, 
though Smith was also well aware that tradition was a necessary contributor to order. The 
interaction between regularity and innovation will become a theme of this paper, and its companion 
for the second session; it is a natural consequence of the opportunity costs of intelligence as an 
inherently scarce resource. 
 
Cattaneo had a lively sense of the ways in which the application of intelligence to economic 
problems is influenced by the environment, and of how this application may itself help to create a 
situation in which intelligence is no longer directed towards economic improvement. At this point 
we encounter the second major component of the psychology of wealth: the will, which both orients 
activity and supplies the determination with which it is pursued. This orientation may be away from 
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wealth (though, as Cattaneo (pp. 81-3) notes, sometimes with unintended consequences, as when 
the injunction to seek the kingdom of God led to the clerical ownership of vast estates), or towards 
the expropriation of other people’s wealth and the interdiction of enterprise because of its potential 
threat to established positions (pp. 87-9); and there is abundant evidence all around us of the 
obstacles to wealth that are created by human will. But if will can assuredly impede economic 
development, Cattaneo (p. 101) is confident that ‘will directed to wealth must favour the 
development of intelligence’; it does so both at the level of the individual (where one may think of 
the combination of intelligence and will that is embodied in Schumpeter’s conception of the 
entrepreneur) and at the level of political and economic organisation, where individual freedom 
encourages the application of will to find new sources of value and new means to achieve it by the 
use of intelligence.  
 
In these two presentations I propose to replace Cattaneo’s ‘will’ with ‘purpose’. My 
principal reason for doing so is Edith Penrose’s example. She invoked human purpose as a powerful 
objection to any explanation of economic phenomena that relies on the direct application of 
biological evolutionary reasoning, from which any hint of purpose is rigidly excluded, either as a 
source of variation or as an element in selection (Penrose 1952). This negative argument has its 
positive counterpart in Penrose’s (1959, 1995) explanation of the processes by which firms grow, in 
which human purpose has a crucial role. Like Penrose, I shall be primarily interested in purpose 
within an organisational context, to which I shall turn in the second presentation; but it is important 
to note immediately that purpose is not to be confused with the concept of a preference function, or 
with rationality when that is interpreted either as a precisely defined relationship between means 
and ends or as consistency. Purpose is to be understood as the intent to achieve some change from 
the present state in accordance with some objectives; it is related to process, not equilibrium, and 
this process entails gaining knowledge and developing capabilities. That is why ‘will directed 
towards wealth must favour the development of intelligence’. An important implication is the 
heterogeneity of economic agents; in the second presentation this will lead to the heterogeneity of 
firms.  
 
Though the reorientation of economics that Cattaneo called for has not yet been achieved, 
one may claim that it is under way, and indeed that Italian economists have been the leading 
contributors; and since the development of ideas is not merely cumulative, but is often assisted by 
the rediscovery of ideas that have been neglected, or even discarded, we should not be surprised to 
find, as already noted, that there are several economic giants on whose shoulders we can stand. It is 
of interest, and a major illustration of Cattaneo’s principle that every point of view has its limits, 
that the most formidable of these giants, Smith, Marshall and Hayek, all developed their 
psychological ideas before they began thinking about economic issues. All were prompted to do so 
by their encounters with problems of knowledge; and they each responded by developing 
explanations of the processes by which knowledge is developed. Moreover they postulated similar 
kinds of process, leading to the formation of connections within particular domains. Each 
recognised that such processes cannot deliver proven truth, and so they envisaged sequences of trial 
and error within particular contexts, leading to the preservation of patterns which appear to 
correspond with perceived phenomena, until this correspondence breaks down, when a new 
sequence of pattern formation begins.  
 
Their theories may therefore be categorised as evolutionary, in the broader Darwinian sense 
of variety generation and the selection and preservation of particular variants; indeed Marshall’s 
and Hayek’s are presented as such, while Smith, though retaining the language of design (which 
neoDarwinians are inclined to treat as a mark of non-evolutionary thinking), rejected the possibility 
of designing either knowledge or human society, and had a major influence, both directly and 
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indirectly, on Darwin’s ideas about the evolutionary process and the general tendency of its 
outcomes. It is not therefore surprising that their explanations have similar implications for the 
quality and reliability of human knowledge, and so call into question the modern fascination with 
rationality, both as the central assumption about economic agency and as the focus of economic 
modelling on the internal coherence of equilibrium (see Giocoli 2003). They also have similar 
implications for the effective organisation of the growth of knowledge; these will be explored in 
tomorrow’s session. 
 
This presentation is organised around Hayek’s theory of the human mind, with Smith’s and 
Marshall’s theories used to provide complements and comparisons. One reason for choosing a 
primary focus on Hayek is that his theory is the most elaborate, and explicitly related to 
neuropsychology (a connection that I propose to exploit); a second reason is that I have recently 
published an article (Loasby 2002) on Smith’s theory of the growth of knowledge as a proto-
evolutionary theory, while Raffaelli (2003) has published what may be the definitive account of 
Marshall’s psychological theory and its influence on his economics. The application of Marshall’s 
model of the mind to the organisation of economic activity, in his own work and beyond, receives 
rather more emphasis in tomorrow’s presentation.  
  
 
Hayek’s Sensory Order 
 
The problem, which attracted Hayek’s attention, was this. ‘In order to be able to give a 
satisfactory account of the regularities existing in the physical world the physical sciences have 
been forced to define the objects of which this world exists increasingly in terms of the observed 
relations between these objects, and at the same time more and more to disregard the way in which 
these objects appear to us’ (Hayek 1952, pp. 2-3). Not only have sensory qualities been 
progressively discarded from this scientific account; they have not been replaced in a way that 
allows them to be mapped onto the new categories, but by a distinctive ordering. Thus ‘objects 
which appear alike to us do not always prove to behave in the same way towards other objects, … 
objects which phenomenally resemble each other need not be physically similar to each other, and 
… sometimes objects which appear to be altogether different may prove to be physically very 
similar’ (Hayek 1952, pp. 5-6). (Note that this problem is defined by the perception of differences.) 
Hayek accepts the superiority of the physical order as a representation of relationships within the 
physical world, including the physical properties of human brains, but he does not ask why the 
human species should have first developed what, from the perspective of the physical sciences, 
appears to be an inferior classification system, but on which we still rely for everyday living; 
instead he asks how the sensory order came into existence. ‘How’ may be thought a more 
‘scientific’ question than ‘why’, and in this instance it may also be thought to have logical priority: 
indeed Hayek’s analysis provides a basis for explaining why, as we shall see later, without being 
satisfied with generalities about a natural tendency to progress – which is a seductive but dangerous 
tendency in evolutionary reasoning. However our initial, and indeed foundational, concern is the 
value of Hayek’s analysis as a general theory of the creation of mental orders – an explanation of 
how the mind works. 
 
Since the disparity to be explained is that between a classification which is based on the 
effects produced by external events on our senses and a classification based on their effects on other 
external events, the focus of inquiry is on systems of relationships, and the key to Hayek’s analysis 
is the hypothesis that ‘causal connexions’ in either classification are linked to ‘structural 
connexions’ within the human brain. It follows that the sensory and physical orders are linked to 
different neurological networks, and that networks of the latter kind are of relatively recent origin; 
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Hayek argues that they are nevertheless similar in construction and operation. The essential point to 
note here is that connections within the brain are selective, and so connections between human 
perceptions and the physical world (including the physical world of the brain) are also selective; 
moreover, being selected within the human brain, which as a physical system is capable of 
sustaining alternative connections, they are ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’.  
 
The characteristic Austrian emphasis on subjectivity therefore has a psychological, indeed 
biological, basis; but it is perfectly compatible both with an objective universe and with the 
possibility of coming to understand it – though not with any final proof of empirical truth; there is 
nothing improbable about the intellectual alliance between Hayek and Popper. The subjectivity of 
the human mind is not just a ‘veil’which conceals but does not influence objective forces; it has real 
effects. It allows great scope for error, because connections may be false or incomplete, and for 
sheer ignorance as defined by Israel Kirzner, because the connections which could have mitigated 
that ignorance may never have been made; it also allows great scope for imagination and novelty, 
through the making of new connections. The link between Hayek and Shackle is well founded 
(though it will receive no more than glancing attention today.) The influences on the formation of 
connections, and on the possibilities of aligning them with the external world, then become an 
important field of study, the results of which may be significant for policy. We shall return to these 
implications later. 
 
Since connections are formed within the brain, and are necessarily highly selective, it might 
be supposed that individuals could develop patterns of connections which are so diverse that they 
fail to understand each other; and this is not a possibility that we should ignore. However, Hayek 
argues that similarities of experience promote similarities of patterns and perceptions, at the level of 
the individual or the species; as we shall see, there are important differences between the 
evolutionary processes at these two levels. Smith’s (1976a [1759]) Theory of Moral Sentiments also 
rests on such similarities of patterns and perceptions. (As just noted, subjectivity is not 
unconstrained.) Because of the normal connotations of the word ‘experience’, it might be more 
appropriate to speak of ‘construing the replication of events’, a terminology introduced by the 
psychologist George Kelly (1963), to whose work we will refer several times. This is indeed an 
accurate definition of the process that is analysed in Hayek’s neuropsychological theory, for what 
events are deemed to constitute a replication is determined by the interpretative framework that is 
applied to them, or in physiological terms, by the neurological pathways that they share. In what 
circumstances people are likely to use similar constructions is an issue that we shall have to 
consider later, as is the issue – perhaps of greater importance – of the possibility of understanding 
substantially different constructions which are used by other people, and of using such different 
constructions within a single coherent economic or social system. Any discussion of such issues 
must be based on some account of how these interpretative frameworks are formed; and that is the 
problem that Hayek explores. 
 
Because its conceptual basis is that of a selectively-connected system, Hayek’s theory is to 
be sharply distinguished from general equilibrium models, in which every element is connected to 
every other. The completeness of these connections (the equivalent of a ‘field theory’) is the basis 
both for analyses of the existence and stability of general equilibrium allocations and for claims 
about their welfare properties; all ‘market failures’ are to be traced to the absence of some 
connections. Potts (2000) has produced an incisive argument that the incompleteness of their 
connections is the crucial fact about all economic systems. The incompleteness of all cognitive 
systems is also the foundation of Simon’s work on human decision-making and organisational 
design, which is part of tomorrow’s agenda; Simon, like Hayek, insists on the importance of 
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interactions between the external environment and the ‘internal environment’ (Hayek 1952, p. 109) 
of the human brain.  
 
Hayek’s hypothesis of connectivity also naturally suggests the need for a process-theoretic 
explanation of the development of selective and systematic connections, and this is what he 
provides. Suggesting a topological isomorphism between the neural and phenomenological orders 
(Hayek 1952, p. 40), he argues that instead of direct connections between particular stimuli and 
particular sensory qualities, the effect that is produced by any stimulus depends, first, on how (or 
indeed whether) it is translated into an impulse in some nerve fibre (Hayek 1952, p. 10) and, 
second, on the location of this impulse in relation to other impulses within the network of 
connections that has already been established within the brain (Hayek 1952, p. 53). ‘The 
transmission of impulses from neuron to neuron within the central nervous system … is thus 
conceived as the apparatus of classification’ (Hayek 1952, p. 52). De Vecchi explores the influence 
on Hayek’s thinking of gestalt psychology, to which Hayek makes approving references. Gestalt 
perceptions which are derived not from the parts but from the relationships between them; and these 
relationships are ‘the result of a process of organization … performed by the nervous system’ (De 
Vecchi 2003, p. 144), which selects a particular combination of connections.  
 
Any impulse is not a carrier of the initial stimulus but a ‘representation’, perhaps with some 
different properties; and this representation is itself interpreted in terms of the relationships which 
have already been established within the brain: thus ‘the qualities which we attribute to the 
experienced objects are strictly speaking not properties of that object at all, but a set of relations by 
which our nervous system classifies them’ (Hayek 1952, p. 143). Hayek immediately and explicitly 
draws on Popper’s language to emphasise that ‘all we know about the world is of the nature of 
theories and all “experience” can do is to change these theories’; in other words, we create a 
different set of connections. All knowledge, including ‘knowledge how’ as well as ‘knowledge that’ 
(Ryle 1949), is constituted by connections; it is a particular set of relationships among many other 
sets that are technically possible, and any such set is always potentially subject to replacement – 
though major changes are not easily achieved, as we have already noted. 
 
Every theory is the outcome of a trial and error process in which theories, and the patterns of 
neural connections which embody them, are tested by the effectiveness of the actions to which they 
lead or their success in interpreting phenomena. The test, of course, is of sufficiency, not optimality, 
in relation to what Hayek (1952, p. 19) calls ‘the discriminations that we perform’, which he 
associates with Ryle’s (1949) category of ‘knowing how’. These discriminations may be of many 
kinds and many degrees of precision (Hayek 1952, p. 71), and so therefore may be their ranges of 
sufficiency (as Kelly (1963) also notes). The perception that a theory is no longer adequate, as a 
basis for action or understanding, stimulates a search for a better theory; since criteria of inadequacy 
are themselves subjective Hayek provides a foundation for ‘Carnegie-type’ models in which search 
is stimulated by a disparity between achievement and aspiration, and in which aspiration levels 
themselves require explanation. It is such a process, Hayek argues, that has gradually led to the 
supersession of sensory theories by physical theories for some important purposes, which were 
associated with different kinds of aspirations. As Hayek points out, this gives us some reason 
(though not a conclusive reason) to expect a closer fit between these physical theories and the 
physical environment, provided that this environment does not change at a faster rate than the 
revision of theories – a point to which we shall return when we come to consider alternative 
versions of this evolutionary process.  
 
However, because we must always use theories to interpret experience before we can use 
experience to modify theories, existing theories provide the conditions which stimulate, or fail to 
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stimulate, the revision of theories and also the starting point for any such revision; thus history 
matters, for the physical as well as the sensory order, though we need not assume that it determines 
unique paths or unique outcomes. Moreover, since all of these theories ‘are generalisations about 
certain kinds of events, and since no number of particular instances can ever prove such a 
generalization, knowledge based entirely on experience may yet be entirely false’ (Hayek 1952, p. 
168). This, we should note, is a restatement of David Hume’s objection to induction as a means of 
demonstrating empirical truth, as well as an endorsement of Popper’s position. It is a powerful 
argument for basing knowledge on a variety of experience, in Kelly’s sense: knowledge will be 
greater if the production and testing of knowledge is dispersed. 
 
 
NeoDarwinism and neoconstructivism 
 
Hayek’s theory of the formation and modification of mental orders is explicitly designed to 
encompass two distinct processes, one of which ‘takes place in the course of the development of the 
single individual’ and one ‘in the course of the development of the species and the results of which 
will be embedded in the structure of the individual organism when it commences its independent 
life (or when it reaches maturity)’ (Hayek 1952, p. 102). The idea of an embedded framework of the 
human mind which (correctly) controlled human knowledge of such basic and universal concepts as 
space and time was developed, in a non-evolutionary fashion, by Kant in response to Hume, and it 
was Herbert Spencer (now so out of favour) who proposed an evolutionary interpretation of such 
embedding which would preserve Kant’s conception of the mind’s power of structuring perceptions 
against the claims of extreme empiricists (Raffaelli 2003, pp. 31-4), thus preparing the way for 
Hayek’s two processes. Hayek (1952, p. 166) extends this interpretation by arguing that ‘experience 
does not begin with sensations or perceptions, but necessarily precedes them … and the distinction 
between sensory qualities, in terms of which alone the conscious mind can learn anything about the 
world, is the result of such pre-sensory experience’. It seems natural to ascribe this evolutionary 
sequence to the species rather than the individual.  
 
However, Smith had already gone further in observing how ‘the ideas of the imagination’ 
could overthrow ‘the evidence of the senses’, which we might now interpret as the ability of ‘the 
development of the single individual’ to override the results of ‘the development of the species’. 
The significance of this capability can hardly be overemphasised; though its evolution is susceptible 
to a biological explanation, its effect is to make possible a human history that is not determined by 
biological mechanisms, and so to create space for social sciences which go beyond biological 
models. In particular, it allows the fundamental principles of evolution to be more broadly 
interpreted. In contrast to the neoDarwinian prescription, social and economic evolution may 
include many selection processes, deliberate as well as natural (though since deliberate selection is 
not based on rational expectations it may have unintended consequences) and it may incorporate 
direct influences of environmental change on the search for novelty, although such novelties cannot 
be directly derived from environmental change. Cattaneo’s twin human attributes, intelligence and 
will, are products of evolution but also help to shape it: the wealth of human societies is a product 
not only of physics and biology, but of psychology also.  
 
Since Hayek’s specific objective was to explain how the sensory order could differ from the 
physical order, it was reasonable for him to leave open the application of his unifying principle to 
the distinctive systems of individual and species development – as Smith left open the application 
of his unifying principle of the division of labour to the distinctive systems of firms and markets; 
but it is now difficult to ignore the important differences between them. Hayek’s presentation in 
terms of individual development, which was – and for many of us still is – easier to connect with 
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our own established schemes of ordering, carefully avoids any discussion of these differences 
(Hayek 1952, pp. 102-3), and this presumably explains why his theory of species development is so 
often overlooked. Some neoDarwinians, however, are very sensitive to the implications of 
proposing two distinctive evolutionary processes. They would argue that Hayek’s theory of 
development within the lifetime of an individual includes no account of any process by which a 
newly-developed order could be transmitted across generations, whereas the neoDarwinian 
transmission mechanism of genetic inheritance can be readily applied to a theory of the 
development of species-specific patterns of behaviour.  
 
Hayek’s account of development within the individual may be interpreted as driven 
by experience, in Kelly’s sense of the constructions that are imposed on a sequence 
of events, through experimentation with new connections and choosing among them 
– both of which may be subjectively influenced; but in species development the role 
of ‘experience’ is not to stimulate experimental changes in mental ordering but only 
to select (objectively) among changes which have occurred by random mutations. 
The double helix is a device for accurate reproduction, and so all mutations must be 
technically regarded as mistakes in copying; and although environmental factors may 
be allowed to influence the frequency of mistakes it is a fundamental principle of 
neoDarwinism that it cannot influence the kind of mistakes that are made. 
‘Experience’ can therefore make no contribution to the generation of modifications, 
but is strictly confined to selecting among modifications that are unrelated to 
experience; instead a very small fraction of these mistakes turn out to enhance 
fitness, and these are preserved by accurate copying to succeeding generations. 
Experience-led learning by individuals is regarded with suspicion by neoDarwinians, 
and it cannot be inherited; our mental orders are genetically adapted to some past 
environment, with the era of hunter-gatherers being a current favorite (see Cosmides 
and Tooby 1994). ‘Intelligence’ and ‘will’ are demoted from the status assigned to 
them by Cattaneo to the role of instrumental variables. 
 
Indeed we may now observe an emerging conflict for supremacy in the social sciences 
between the rival unifying theories of rational choice equilibrium and neoDarwinian evolution. The 
two stand in a curious relationship. Both are theories about selection between alternatives and the 
preservation of what is selected; and in both, selection is based on the consequences of those 
alternatives which are presented for selection. However, rational choosers, being equipped with 
rational expectations, know these consequences in advance, and having made the correct choices 
they naturally have no wish to change them, but remain in their equilibrium state until there is some 
shock to the economic system. (Their cognitive system, being already fully connected and therefore 
perfect, never changes.) In the neoDarwinian model, by contrast, no-one knows the consequences of 
the available alternatives, and any attempt to design alternatives in order to produce desirable 
consequences is a pretence that is unworthy of science; but if neoDarwinian processes can discover 
the best answer that is currently available only after trying all existing (though not all possible) 
alternatives, nevertheless the best currently available answer will be discovered, and once 
discovered it will be conserved in the genetic code, which may then be observationally 
indistinguishable from an equilibrium allocation. By appropriate allowance for the costs of this 
process one may even be able to make claims for optimality along similar lines to the claims for 
optimality, subject to information and transaction costs, that are sometimes put forward in 
economics. Thus assumptions which appear to be polar opposites can, with a little sleight of 
thought, support identical outcomes.  
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Now deriving equilibria from the initial data is analytically simpler than tracing processes, 
because the stages of these processes are not themselves full equilibria and are therefore difficult for 
the modeller to control in a non-arbitrary fashion, as has been discovered by those economists who 
attempted to provide a model of equilibration that would conform to the established criteria for 
modelling general equilibrium. Partial equilibria can be devised, but any particular partial 
equilibrium is always open to objection – particularly by those who believe either in rationality or in 
the long-term power of neoDarwinian processes. (The standard isolation of game-theoretic models 
from the wider environment raises dual questions about the appropriateness of this assumption of 
environmental irrelevance and the applicability of these models in a wider domain, which modellers 
do not always address.) So we should not be surprised that some evolutionary theorists are attracted 
by the relative simplicities of equilibrium modelling; and one particularly attractive application is 
the direct attribution of particular medical conditions or behaviour to specific genes. The 
explanation of performance by structure is a favourite theoretical principle across many disciplines, 
and a direct link between final outcomes and the initial data has the dual appeal of simplicity and 
plausibility, especially when the initial data can be identified as a specific gene sequence.  
 
However, there is some resistance to the dominance of this strategy among 
neuropsychologists; and the combination of argument and evidence which they have produced 
should have particular resonance among social scientists of an evolutionary inclination, especially 
those who are impressed with Hayek’s reasoning. The following account is based on a series of 
papers, some jointly-authored, by Professor Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Head of the Neurocognitive 
Development Unit at University College London, and an acknowledged leader in her field. In a 
lecture to mark the Centenary of the British Psychological Society (Karmiloff-Smith 2002) she 
argues for the significance of individual development in shaping the outcomes of genetic 
endowments. Her starting-point is the use by neoDarwinian geneticists of evidence from adult 
neuropsychological patients and children with genetic disorders to support claims that the human 
brain is organised into specialised modules which are directed by specialised genes. She offers a 
fundamental methodological criticism that will appeal to all Austrians: an exclusive focus on the 
relationship between initial conditions and end-states may lead us astray, and a better understanding 
of causation requires attention to the processes by which these end-states are produced.  
 
Her central example is of a genetic disorder, the Williams Syndrome, which is clearly associated 
both with the deletion of 17 specific genes and with a specific set of physical consequences in 
adults, including a smaller brain volume, an abnormal size, orientation and density of neurons, and 
atypical proportions of several regions of the brain, together with psychological consequences of 
low IQ and low spatial skills, with the notable exception of unimpaired proficiency in facial 
recognition. This combination appears to supply strong prima facie evidence for an exclusively 
genetic explanation, and has been cited (e.g. by Pinker 1997, 1999) in support of a theory of the 
direct determination of behaviour, including altruism, aggression, intelligence, spatial cognition and 
language, by specific genes or specific sets of genes (Karmiloff-Smith 2002, p. 526).  
 
Such an exclusive explanation is then confronted with further evidence. First, patients who 
lack a subset of these 17 genes do not exhibit corresponding subsets of the symptoms. (Though the 
sample size is small, universal claims, such as that for exclusive and specific genetic determination 
of end-states, may logically be refuted by a single counter-example; questions about the evidence 
must be questions about the experimental procedure which has generated an apparent counter-
example, not about its logical status.) Second, in response to the claim that the apparently 
unimpaired proficiency of people with Williams Syndrome in facial recognition demonstrates an 
intact face-processing module, careful experimentation revealed that these people were processing 
faces feature by feature, whereas the supposed ‘face-processing module’ relies on overall 
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configuration. (Of particular interest is the observation that control subjects were equally reliant on 
featural processing when they were presented with inverted faces; the implications of this will be 
considered in the second presentation.) Differences between experimental and control subjects were 
also found in the means of producing some other supposedly-intact skills; thus the ‘pattern of intact 
versus impaired modules formed from intact versus mutated genes’, which the theory of purely 
genetic determination requires, is removed by ‘[d]ifferentiating between superficial behavioural 
scores and underlying cognitive processes’ (Karmiloff-Smith 2002, p. 536). Third, experimentation 
with infants revealed substantial differences from the results with adults, while the use as controls 
of infants with Down’s Syndrome had the incidental effect of demonstrating notable differences 
between the infant and adult states of those affected by this syndrome also; such changes in 
response during the course of development, implying a reconfiguration of neural networks, is not 
consistent with nativist claims that directly link impaired modules with adult states (Karmiloff-
Smith 2002, p. 538). 
 
These results do not, of course, overthrow the conception of a genetically driven 
evolutionary process, or indeed the argument that many human physical and behavioural 
characteristics are genetically determined; but the modified theory that is offered by Professor 
Karmiloff-Smith, in conjunction with other cognitive neuropsychologists, allows scope for 
‘complex pathways from gene-to-brain-to-cognitive-processes-to-behaviour’ (Karmiloff-Smith 
2002, p. 526). Genetics, and the neoDarwinian model of which they are the focus, retain a major 
role, both directly and by supplying the potential for the development of alternative pathways; but 
there is nevertheless considerable space for social scientists to develop evolutionary explanations of 
a somewhat different kind, for which genetic constraints may provide an appropriate baseline, such 
as all evolutionary explanations need. This kind of permissive linkage between disciplines appears 
to correspond to Ziman’s view of science. Though commending ‘weak’ reductionism – the search 
for underlying commonalities – as a research strategy, Ziman (2000, pp. 323, 326) objects to 
‘strong’ reductionism – the unification of knowledge by the universal application of fundamental 
principles, precisely because no such principles can explain ‘the spontaneous emergence of novel 
modes of order in complex systems’; and these selective connections produce ‘a simplification of 
nature, and of human cognition as naturally evolved, that actually makes scientific research 
possible’.  
 
Explanations of the emergence of order, in human brains and in human societies, are 
therefore not confined to random mutations and natural selection, though neither is excluded, but 
can incorporate the search for novelty, through making new connections, and choices that are made 
for what appear to be good reasons, because they embody plausible connections. They may go 
beyond this to suggest why particular reasons may be thought to be good (even sometimes when 
they are not) and why searches may be undertaken in particular circumstances and may proceed in 
particular directions. Thus such explanations are not restricted to explaining how people may get 
things right, but may also help to understand how they may go astray – and an understanding of the 
reasons for failure may have practical uses. The drastic simplifications of assuming all economic 
agents to be hard-wired optimisers who are extremely well informed (and if confronted with 
asymmetric information know precisely what are the implications of what they do not know), which 
excludes the need for any process other than Bayesian updating, will, however, not suffice. The 
kind of psychology-based social science developed by Hayek, on the other hand, is highly 
congenial.  
 
In fact, the final sentence of Karmiloff-Smith’s lecture would serve as a present-day 
introduction to Hayek’s Sensory Order: ‘The contrasting view [to the static model of genetic 
determination of adult states] presented in this lecture is that our aim should be to understand how 
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genes are expressed through development, because the major clue to genotype-phenotype relations 
is not simply in the genes, or simply in the interaction between genes and environment, but in the 
very process of development itself’ (Karmiloff-Smith 2002, p. 540). In other papers she argues that 
‘on the gene side, the interaction lies in the outcome of the interacting, cascading effects of 
interacting genes and their environments and, on the environment side, the interaction comes from 
the infant’s progressive selection and processing of different kinds of input. … The child’s way of 
processing environmental stimuli is likely to change repeatedly as a function of development, 
leading to the progressive formation of domain-specific representations’ (Karmiloff-Smith 1998, p. 
390).  
 
In a jointly-written paper advocating ‘an emergentist solution to the Nature-Nurture 
controversy’, she and her colleagues emphasise ‘the extraordinarily plastic and activity-dependent 
nature of cortical specialisation’. Because ‘cortical regions are likely to differ from the outset in 
style of computation, which means that they will also differ in the variety of tasks they can perform 
best’, there may be widespread dispositions to convert domain-relevance into domain-specificity; 
nevertheless any particular pattern of domain-specificity is a consequence of development (Bates et 
al. 1998). The argument that the localisation of mental functions does not imply localisation in any 
particular part of the cortex, and that alternative pathways may be developed in response to specific 
damage, had already been made by Hayek (1952, pp. 147-8), citing Lashley’s (1929) account of 
‘vicarious functioning’ and ‘equipotentiality’.) Though much is genetically determined and the 
remainder is genetically constrained, nevertheless in important respects ‘the brain progressively 
sculpts itself, slowly becoming specialised over developmental time’ (Karmiloff-Smith 2002, p. 
527). 
 
‘The expression of genes through development’, rather than entirely by programming, may 
itself be given an evolutionary explanation, as Karmiloff-Smith (1998, p. 390) notes: ‘although 
evolution has pre-specified many constraints on development, it has made the human neocortex 
increasingly flexible and open to learning during postnatal development. In other words, evolution 
is argued to have selected for adaptive outcomes and a strong capacity to learn, rather than prior 
knowledge. Within such a perspective, it is more plausible to think in terms of what one might call 
domain-relevant mechanisms that might gradually become domain-specific as a result of processing 
different kinds of input.’ There has been some evolution away from genetically specified domain-
specificity towards a genetically-enabled multi-specific capability for creating domain-specific 
skills through development, in what we shall presently characterize as a Smithian evolutionary 
process. Domain-specificity – the division of labour – is a general characteristic, but some domains 
may be genetically specified and others may become specified during the course of development.  
 
Present-day humans therefore embody a partial shift from ‘evolution in the course of the 
development of the species’ towards ‘evolution in the course of the development of the single 
individual’ – a shift which has been confirmed by natural selection, but which entails other forms of 
selection (for a discussion of some of these, see Loasby 2001). This process of learning works 
through the creation and modification of connections within the brain, for selective connections are 
the key to human cognition. If two stimuli are experienced differently, ‘this difference must be 
reflected somewhere in the brain. Every new piece of learning changes the structure of the brain in 
some fashion, however minor’ (Bates et al., 1998). This is precisely how learning is modelled by 
Hayek. The development of a new system of connections that constitutes a physical order, and 
which at first supplements and then increasingly supersedes our sensory order in many contexts, 
may be seen as a consequence of this major trend in selection within the human species. This 
evolution of the evolutionary process deserves some further consideration. 
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That specialization on a particular range of activities would result in a progressive 
movement from relatively undifferentiated potential to domain-specific knowledge 
and capabilities, which could confer distinctive advantages, was Adam Smith’s great 
idea. It was applied to the world of nature by Milne-Edwards (1827, p. 534) to 
explain the great variety of species, and this gave Darwin the principle which 
governed the direction of evolution. We may now draw on our knowledge of 
genetics to argue that the detailed specification of a limited range of behavior for 
each species provided evolutionary space for very many different species to 
demonstrate that their evolved domain-specific behavioral regularities conferred 
sufficient comparative advantage within their specific environment to allow them to 
survive, though any comparative advantage may be extinguished by changes in this 
environment, including the evolution of other species. Only in the human species is 
this specialization associated with exchange, though the principle of complementary 
specialization is manifest in social insects and in many specific inter-species 
relationships – plants and pollinating insects provide the largest class of examples – 
and in a broader sense in ecology.  
 
However, speciation is only the first stage of differentiation. The growth of the pre-human 
brain allowed for an increasing range of behaviour within each individual; but what appears to have 
been a crucial change resulted from a very rapid increase in brain size between 500,000 and 
100,000 years ago. Because it followed the change to an upright stance, which inhibited 
enlargement of the birth canal, this increase could be accommodated only by the birth of infants at a 
very early stage of brain development; this made them extremely vulnerable to both accident and 
predation for an exceptionally long period, and could therefore have been selected for only if it was 
associated with some great advantage. This advantage, we may now conjecture, seems to have been 
precisely the ability of this new genetically-endowed cognitive capacity to form better 
representations of each individual’s local environment as it was encountered, and to develop more 
appropriate skills to deal with it – which is the kind of adaptation cited by Karmiloff-Smith. For this 
purpose ‘the unusually slow period of human postnatal brain development’ (Karmiloff-Smith 1998, 
p. 394) is actually an advantage, for the connections in the brain are being formed while the child is 
interacting with the environment. With an appropriate genetic endowment of programmable rather 
than programmed capacity, domain-specific skills can be developed within individuals as well as 
through the evolution of species; and this new variant of evolution can cope with faster 
environmental change than reliance on the selection and diffusion of fortuitous genetic mutations, 
and also with movement into an environment that has not previously been experienced by that 
individual. Hayek’s model of development at the individual level applies.  
 
This interaction between the growing brain and the environment could not have happened if 
the development of this larger brain were strictly genetically determined; but the extraordinary 
increase in the size of the brain entailed a far greater proportionate increase in the number of 
potential connections, and it is very hard for a non-specialist to see how the programming capacity 
of the genome could have increased sufficiently to cope with this increase. Specialists appear to 
share this view. ‘On mathematical grounds, it is difficult to understand how 10
14 synaptic 
connections in the human brain could be controlled by a genome with approximately 10
8 genes, 
particularly when … humans share approximately 98% of their genes with their nearest primate 
neighbours’ (Bates et al. 1998). Hayek (1952, p. 185) applied his proposition that ‘the capacity of 
any explaining agent must be limited to objects with a structure possessing a degree of complexity 
lower than its own’ to the human brain; it is no less applicable to the programming capacity of the 
genome. Instead, ‘brain development in the higher vertebrates appears to involve massive 
overproduction of elements early in life (neurons, axons and synapses), followed by a competitive 
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process through which successful elements are kept and those that fail are eliminated’ (Bates et al. 
1998); this is a non-genetic application of neoDarwinian evolution which introduces a different 
evolutionary process.  
 
The diminution of genetic control has allowed cognitive development to be shaped by 
interaction with particular environments at the level of the individual, on evolutionary principles of 
variation and selective preservation. Thus the evolutionary process has itself evolved, as genetic 
determination has been supplemented by genetically-enabled capabilities, in a way that increases 
adaptation – at least in the short term, in relation to the time scale of genetic evolution (though even 
within a human lifetime, as Adam Smith realised, the development of domain-specific skills and 
habits of thought may lead to dangerous reductions of adaptability). The evolution of the 
evolutionary process, though not precisely so expressed, is also a feature of Adam Smith’s 
psychological theory of the growth of knowledge, in which specialisation between individuals, in 
both knowledge and capabilities, is a later development that enhances the effectiveness of the 
powerful motivation to create mental models of puzzling phenomena (Loasby 2002). The principle 
that greater diversity requires a relaxation of central control is familiar in studies of organisational 
design and innovation; and it is, of course, a central principle of Austrian economics. (It is not good 
news for economists who rely on general equilibrium modelling.) That this diversity within the 
human species should apparently be an unintended consequence of the increase in brain size (even 




Smith and Marshall 
 
At this point it is appropriate to observe the similarities, and the differences, between 
Hayek’s analysis and the psychological theories that, as noted towards the end of the introduction, 
were developed early in their careers by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall. As we have seen, it was 
the sensory order that Hayek set out to explain; in his exposition of ‘the principles which lead and 
direct philosophical enquiries’ Adam Smith (1980 [1795]) had sought to account for the 
development of mental representations of the physical order. Smith was familiar with Hume’s 
simple proof that there could be no procedure for deriving universal laws from observation or 
experiment, and consequently no impregnable basis for deductive reasoning about phenomena. He 
accepted Hume’s recommendation that we should turn our attention to the processes by which 
people came to treat empirical propositions as if they were unquestionably true; but he seems to 
have been dissatisfied with Hume’s argument that people were ‘excited by nature’ to believe in 
‘constant conjunctions’ (Hume 1875, p. 41), and developed an explanation which gave distinctive 
roles both to the innovative human mind and to human emotions.  
 
He suggested that it is characteristic of human nature to be uncomfortable when unable to 
make sense of a particular phenomenon, especially when that phenomenon is repeated; people 
therefore try to invent ‘connecting principles’ that will collect unexplained phenomena into 
categories and provide an acceptable explanation of these categories. Satisfactory explanations are a 
source of positive pleasure, especially if the solution is aesthetically pleasing, and are likely to be 
widely adopted by those encountering such phenomena. The discomfort resulting from a subsequent 
failure to accommodate some new phenomenon within an established pattern then provides the 
stimulus to create a new interpretative system by a rearrangement of connections, which may also 
entail a rearrangement of categories (for example, the set of ‘planets’). In relation to Hayek’s 
analysis, Smith may be interpreted as explaining how a physical order may emerge – and diverge – 
from a sensory order, and showing how sensations guide this process.  
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That Smith, like Hayek, had a conception of knowledge as a set of replaceable theories is 
most strikingly demonstrated by his insistence that Newton’s theories were the product of Newton’s 
imagination, not a direct perception of the truth. As Smith noticed, its general acceptance is to be 
explained by the rhetorical appeal of its unifying principle, which unites terrestrial and 
cosmological phenomena. Smith (1980 [1795], p. 77) even noticed that people’s desire for 
theoretical comfort could be powerful enough to override the evidence of the senses, such as the 
overwhelming sensory evidence of a stationary earth, ‘in order to preserve the coherence of the 
ideas of their imagination’. Though this supersession of sensory evidence was clearly a major 
element in the problem that Hayek attempted to resolve, his explanation is focused on the 
physiological mechanisms and does not incorporate the motivational issues that were so important 
to Smith.  
 
Because psychology was at that time closely associated with philosophy, it is not surprising 
that Smith did not attempt to provide a physiological underpinning for what we may now call his 
evolutionary theory of cognition. He did, however, extend that theory to explain how the division of 
labour promotes the growth of knowledge. First, science emerges as an identifiable category of 
knowledge with its own practitioners, and then, as scientific knowledge expands, specialisation 
between the sciences simultaneously increases the range of study within the scientific community 
and the attention to detail within each sector. At each stage this closer focus accelerates the 
perception of anomalies which, by causing intellectual discomfort even when they appear to have 
no practical significance, stimulate the invention of new ‘connecting principles’ that may 
accommodate them. (That practical significance may play no part in very powerful motivations is 
amply demonstrated by Giocoli (2003); this is a theme that will not be developed in either of these 
presentations.) Then Smith (1976b [1776]) transferred his theory of the growth of knowledge from 
science to the economy through his fundamental proposition that the division of labour, because of 
its powerful effects on the growth of knowledge, is the primary instrument of economic growth; in 
the process the emphasis switched to the importance of attention to detail as a problem-generator, 
the solution of productive problems providing sufficiently obvious motivation. (For an extended 
account, see Loasby 2002). 
 
It was this application that attracted Marshall’s attention, and not Smith’s  underlying 
psychological  theory, which Marshall may never have read. However, Marshall had already 
recognised the possibility of a conjunction between contemporary associationist psychology and 
Darwin’s ideas (which, as has been noted, owed much to Smith’s emphasis on the advantages of 
differentiation), and in the process provided a physical equivalent of Smith’s cognitive theory. 
Marshall’s encounter with the problems of knowledge has been explored by Butler (1991), 
Groenewegen (1995), and Raffaelli (2003); it may be sufficient to note here that this encounter was 
prompted by a major intellectual controversy about the possibility of demonstrating religious truths, 
which coincided with Marshall’s own religious doubts.  
 
His response was clearly shaped by Alexander Bain’s (1864, 1865) major reorientation of 
psychology from philosophy towards physiology, which had the unintended effect of making it 
readily accessible to Darwin’s ideas, as Marshall quickly realised; he had read The Origin of 
Species by March 1867 (Groenewegen 1995, p. 119). He did not think of connections between 
neurons (which was a later pattern of thought), but wondered how far the psychological processes 
of knowledge development could be represented by a mechanical system, and devised the most 
elaborate model of his whole life in order to investigate this question (Marshall 1994). In doing so 
he was consciously following the example of Charles Babbage, who (we may note in passing) had 
been inspired by the decision of the French mathematician Prony to organise the production of 
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mathematical tables on Smith’s principles of the division of labour (see Raffaelli 2003, pp. 52-3). 
The possibility of reducing biology to physics is not a recent idea, and the problematic relationship 
between mechanical and biological concepts which pervades Marshall’s economic analysis seems 
to have its origin here. (This relationship is another topic to be excluded from the present 
discussion.) 
 
Marshall’s ‘machine’ is first conceived as a combination of a ‘body’, which is capable of 
receiving sensations from its environment and performing actions in that environment, and a 
‘brain’, which has no direct connection with the environment and therefore must operate, as in 
Smith’s and Hayek’s theories, by forming selective connections. Marshall indicates this by 
restricting the brain to operating with ‘ideas of sensations’ and ‘ideas of actions’; it works by 
linking the idea of an initial sensation received by the body with the idea of an action which the 
body performs in response, and then linking the latter with the idea of a sensation that is interpreted 
as a consequence of that action. If the latter linkage produces a pleasurable sensation, then the 
linkage from initial sensation to action is strengthened, and if the sensation is unpleasant it is 
weakened. The suggested mechanism, possibly inspired by Babbage’s conceptions of analytic 
engines and automata, to which Marshall refers, is of wheels connected by bands, which may 
become tighter or looser in response to the sensation experienced. This cumulative trial and error 
process, which forms associations of contiguity or similarity, is consistent with Bain’s account of 
the physiology of mental phenomena; and Marshall shows how the process could produce complex 
patterns of relationships. The basic mechanism, including the importance of sensation, also 
corresponds quite closely with Smith’s mentally-focussed account of the growth of knowledge, 
though it would correspond even better with an elaborated account of the process by which the 
division of labour fosters the development of capabilities. Indeed it should be noted that in 
Marshall’s presentation action is essential to the formation or dissolution of associations; this was to 
become an important element in Marshall’s theory of economic development. Not only does every 
action start with some act of intelligence, as Cattaneo observed; actions favour the development of 
intelligence. 
 
Over time such a machine may develop a range of closely connected sensations and actions, 
which we might now call routines; these routines are not the result of anticipatory choice but of 
environmental selection among actions which, by Marshall’s intentional specification of his model, 
cannot originate in consequential reasoning. Although the imprint of his mathematical training is 
unmistakable in the conception and structure of his ‘machine’, he has already moved away from the 
axiomatic method as the appropriate way of deciding what to do. To be precise – and this may 
sometimes be very important, though Marshall does not say so – selection depends on the 
environment as it is perceived by the machine. In the elaboration of his model this environment 
contains other machines that operate on similar principles, but because of differences in initial 
perceptions and initial actions and the selective reinforcement of what appears to work they may 
develop different connections. Thus a population of machines constructed to a uniform design may 
generate the variety which is essential for any evolutionary process.  
 
Marshall continues his evolutionary sequence by postulating the emergence of a second 
level of control within the brain, which uses similar mechanisms for different purposes (an early 
example of exaptation as a postulated evolutionary mechanism). Ideas of sensations received which 
have not been linked to any idea of satisfactory action can now be referred to this higher level, 
which may generate the idea of a novel action and associate it with the idea of a sensation produced 
by its effects. Expectations appear; but they appear as conjectures. A pleasurable linkage of 
contemplated ideas is then transferred to the lower level, where it directs bodily action; and if the 
action produces the anticipated sensation the corresponding link between initial sensation and action 
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forms a new routine. This is a crucial development: it introduces imagination and the possibility of 
trial and error within the mind which may improve the chances of success in the environment, thus 
opening the path to modern practices of research and development. Since both the conjectures 
generated at this level and the internal selection processes applied to them are not random but 
oriented to problems, the course of development is influenced by human intelligence and human 
will. This does not conform to modern neoDarwinian principles of variety generation; but it does 
not conflict with the broader Darwinian principle of selection at the practical level, as in Darwin’s 
own example of selective breeding. 
 
Marshall’s formulation has substantial virtues as an evolutionary model which conforms to a 
basic economic principle: certain regularities of behaviour are selected and reinforced by their 
success in extracting benefit from their environment, by a procedure which operates at low cost in 
mental energy. Another economic principle may be discerned in Marshall’s distinction between two 
categories of evolutionary sequences, which we may now distinguish, in Hayek’s terms, as the 
development of the species and development within the individual: this is Smith’s principle of the 
division of labour, which accelerates the growth of knowledge. The evolution of the brain is clearly 
a biological phenomenon, though the sequence may be explained by the application of basic 
economic principles to biology. The second level, which is much more energy intensive, requires 
the prior development of the first as an effective survival mechanism and subsequently as a 
problem-generator; with this precondition it becomes an important source of potential improvement 
in the machine’s performance, achieved at low overall cost in mental energy by the separation of 
levels and specialisation between them. The additional effort of generating and checking ideas is 
undertaken only when the existing set of routines has proved inadequate, and does not disturb those 
elements in the set which appear to work well; any improvements in performance are stored at the 
lower level, and thus cease to require active supervision. It is an efficient mechanism for making 
local adjustments, a precursor of Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis.  
 
These improvements in performance exemplify evolution at the level of the individual, 
which is made possible by the evolution of the relevant capabilities at the level of the species, and 
we may suppose that this partial switch from programming behaviour to programming the potential 
– from fully-specified to imperfectly-specified systems – was itself naturally selected because of its 
superiority over genetic modification in adapting to changed circumstances (as argued in the earlier 
section on neuropsychology). Smith’s foundational proposition applies to the division of labour 
between evolution at the level of the species and evolution at the level of the individual. Though 
Marshall does not argue in these terms – that is hardly to be expected at this date – he clearly 
distinguishes between the capabilities that are built into a machine and the particular connections 
which that machine develops, and he assigns different roles to them.  
 
Marshall and Hayek have much in common, but also some useful differences. Both explain 
the growth of knowledge by the creation of selective connections, and both are concerned with 
mechanisms that make this possible, though Marshall is content with what we would now call a 
constructive existence proof (explaining how it could be done) while Hayek seeks to explain how it 
is actually done. On the other hand, whereas Hayek’s explanation deliberately avoids any 
differentiation between development of the species and development at the level of the individual, 
Marshall uses this differentiation (though without explicit reference to machines as a species) to 
account for the evolution of the brain’s capabilities. In addition, both examine two processes within 
the brain, which are built of similar elements but produce different results; this common source of 
differentiated outcomes is a feature of evolutionary thinking. However, whereas Marshall’s 
processes, though relying on similar mechanisms, necessarily operate at different levels of the brain, 
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Hayek presents the processes of creating the sensory and physical orders as if they operate within 
the same level.  
 
Marshall’s model can be used to supplement Hayek’s theory: the sensory order can be 
produced by pure mechanism, but the physical order requires the imaginative capabilities of the 
higher level. On this interpretation the physical order, though developed at the level of the 
individual, requires capabilities that result from further development at the level of the species. 
Smith’s psychological theory of knowledge also assumes the capabilities that Marshall assigns to 
the higher level; and the motivational basis of this theory can be invoked to explain why the 
selection criteria that are used to construct the physical order, which are directly linked to the 
imagination, may lead to patterns that conflict with the sensory order. Neither order is directly 
imposed by phenomena; both are constructed within the brain, by similar methods but at different 
stages and within different possibility sets. As Hayek observed (quoted earlier) ‘all we know about 
the world is of the nature of theories’. 
 
We may conclude that Smith, Marshall, and Hayek collectively offer a good basis for 
analysing the psychology of intelligence as a source of wealth, and this theme will be developed 
tomorrow in the particular context of organisation. We should also note that all three were also 
interested in the factors that Cattaneo included in the category of ‘will’. No Smithian scholar is 
likely to underrate the importance of ‘moral sentiments’ in Smith’s scheme of thought, and much of 
Hayek’s later work was devoted to the institutional and political support for both freedom and 
prosperity. However, since choices must be made, we shall deal only, and that briefly, with 
Marshall, because his treatment was closely linked with both psychology and economics, as 
Raffaelli (2003) has shown.  
 
It is well known that Marshall contemplated a specialisation in psychology, and towards the 
end of his life expressed at least a passing regret that he had not done so. His  primary reason for 
preferring economics to psychology was the ‘increasing urgency of economic studies, as a means 
towards human well-being  …  not so much in relation to growth as to the quality of life’ (Whitaker 
1996, II, p. 285); and the quality of life was crucially dependent on mental as well as physical 
factors. Better knowledge was a primary source not only of increased productivity (as mainstream 
economists have rediscovered) but also of better patterns of consumption (which is still neglected); 
for Marshall, preference functions, like production functions, were a product of the economic 
system. However, to understand behaviour it was necessary to go beyond knowledge of what was 
available and of its possible effects, to what Marshall called character. In sketching the breadth of 
potential for his machine he concluded by describing it as ‘a moral being’ (Marshall 1994, p.129), 
and perhaps of particular significance is that when, in an earlier section, he used Babbage’s 
suggestion of a chess automaton to illustrate how his ‘machine’ might choose between alternatives 
he observes that ‘[w]hen a man is playing  at chess, just as when he is doing anything else, his 
character is displayed in the way in which he grasps at immediate advantages or, on the other hand, 
tries to look further’ (Marshall 1994, p. 122).  
 
Raffaelli (2003) argues that it was because Marshall was both so concerned with improving 
the quality of life for most people and impressed with the effects of the economic system on this 
quality, and especially on individual character, that he was not prepared to follow John Stuart Mill’s 
prescription that economists should deduce the necessary general laws of economic activity and 
leave to psychologists the study of individual variations and their consequences. The ‘escape from 
psychology’ that economists achieved during the twentieth century (Giocoli 2003) was not for him 
– and he would not have been surprised by some of its consequences. Economics was  
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on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important side, part of the 
study of man. For man’s character has been moulded by his everyday work and the material 
resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence unless it be that of 
his religious ideals. … his character is being formed by the way in which he uses his 
faculties in his work, by the thoughts and the feelings which it suggests, and by the relations 
to his associates at work 
 
 Marshall 1920, pp. 1-2  
 
Marshall therefore gave particular attention to the effects of economic organisation on the use of 
talents and the development of character, which he believed were aspects of the same process; and 
since progress depended on variation the differences between individuals should not be suppressed 
either in economic analysis or in economic systems.  
 
  It is, of course, possible to include ‘character’ (as it is possible to include ‘moral 
sentiments’) in a formal preference function, but that would not be an innocuous move. The modern 
preference function has become detached from the idea of human agency, and a prime reason for 
that, as Giocoli (2003) shows, is that choice theory has been reduced to a demonstration of 
consistency; the actual process of choosing is no longer discussable. It is in this process that 
character, or will, becomes important; rather than forming part of a preference function, its effects 
are better discussed in a category such as Herbert Simon’s ‘decision premises’, which should be 
extended to include decision procedures. When Marshall (1920, pp. 216-7) is discussing the 
provision that parents make for the education of their children, he writes of ‘moral qualities’ and ‘a 
certain habit of mind’. This is entirely in accordance with Marshall’s theory of the mind, which is a 
theory that depends on the interplay between automatic and novel connections.    
 
Smith, Marshall and Hayek all built their systems on the fundamental economic principle of 
scarcity; but what is scarce in their systems is human cognitive capacity and the energy that is 
necessary to drive it. These are precisely the only resources that are assumed to be freely available 
in most formal models in present-day economics, which thus ignore the most fundamental of all 
allocation problems that human beings face. It is ignored by the familiar Chicago objection to 
regulation, which rests on the assumed abundance of entrepreneurship; the Austrian objection is 
more soundly based on the importance of incentives to expand the supply (Audretsch, Baumol and 
Burke 1999, p. 620). Smith, Marshall and Hayek also effectively, if unintentionally, provide the 
framework for explaining why the assumption that cognition alone has no opportunity costs is 
maintained by most economists; it is essential to underpin the concept of rational choice equilibrium 
(as Herbert Simon often pointed out), and thus, in Smith’s (1980 [1795] p. 77) words, already cited, 
‘to preserve the coherence of the ideas of their imagination’. Smith’s, Marshall’s and Hayek’s 
psychological systems rely on routines and institutions which economise on cognition, and so do 
the economic systems that they later considered and which are populated by human beings who are 
equipped with such systems. The economizing properties of ecological rationality provide the 
theme of Vernon Smith’s (2003) Nobel lecture, in which Hayek is appropriately cited; and for him 
as for these earlier authors the preservation of such established structures is an important 
economising principle. The practice of mainstream economists naturally exemplifies a reliance on 
rules and institutions in doing economics, and the consequent preservation of existing structures, 
rather than the principles of global rationality which are apparently embodied in their models. 
 
The routines and institutions within Smith’s, Marshall’s and Hayek’s psychological 
systems have the additional merit of focusing attention on the issues for which they 
are inadequate at any particular time; consequently these are systems in which the 
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evolutionary sequence of variety generation, selection, and the preservation of 
selected variants in the form of modified or novel routines and institutions is a 
natural occurrence. Indeed, one can say that there can be no evolution without 
routines. This evolutionary sequence may be handled, in somewhat different ways, at 
several levels; these may include, for example, genetic and neurophysiological 
structures, ideas, and organizations, formal and informal, which link together clusters 
of routines and institutions and provide both the framework and the problems for 
continuing innovation.  
 
Some implications  
 
Let us now consider some of the implications of these psychological theories, in the light of the 
general corroboration and specific refinements suggested by neuroconstructivists. We shall also 
exploit the similarities with George Kelly’s (1963) theory of personality, which focuses particularly 
on the problem of preserving the internal coherence of an individual’s ‘interpretative system’ while 
simultaneously maintaining a satisfactory correspondence with the events that are encountered by 
that individual or precipitated by her actions, and in doing so provides a powerful line of enquiry 
into persistent biases and obstructions to learning. Apparently-relevant evidence may be ignored, 
and locally-effective explanations may be dismissed, because they appear incompatible with ways 
of making sense that have become indispensable – even in the hardest of sciences, as Ziman (1978) 
observes. The pathological imperative to impose such coherence on the theoretical systems of 
modern economics without empirical warrant or even empirical reference, which Giocoli (2003) has 
clinically examined, is a particularly suitable case for Kelly’s treatment.  
 
Hayek’s conclusion to his investigation into the problem of psychological explanation is 
that, because of the limits of any apparatus of classification, ‘no explaining agent can ever explain 
objects of its own kind, or of its own degree of complexity, and, therefore, that the human brain can 
never fully explain its own operations’ (Hayek 1952, p. 185). Although we can hope to understand 
the principles underlying our own mental processes, ‘mind must remain forever a realm of its own 
which we can know only through directly experiencing it, but which we shall never be able fully to 
explain or to “reduce” to something else’ (Hayek 1952, p. 194). Human cognition is inevitably 
bounded, as Simon also insisted. Hayek also draws attention to the impossibility of achieving a full 
explanation of the world around us, while simultaneously supplying a principle of organisation for 
the human brain and for human societies; and this is the starting-point for the following discussion.  
 
Hayek’s impossibility theorem warns us that our knowledge is necessarily fallible and 
incomplete, but it also suggests, as do Smith’s and Marshall’s theories, how it may be improved and 
tested, and what kinds of opportunity costs are likely to be incurred along different pathways of 
attempted improvement. Knowledge is created by selecting connections which will constitute 
domain-specific modules; and we may identify two general principles on which to base this 
selection, which apply both to everyday cognitive operations and to those special cases in which we 
are consciously attempting to construct interpretative frameworks, some of which we may choose to 
call theories. As all four authors indicate, these cases are not so very special; Smith and Kelly 
explicitly focus, from different angles, on ‘man as scientist’. One principle directs us towards fine 
discrimination in our definition of categories, at the expense of reducing the breadth of our view 
and ignoring interactions with the rest of the universe, thus restricting our pattern-making to a 
narrow domain which we may be able to explore in some depth. The second principle points 
towards the strategy of aggregating the elements of our universe into broad invented categories on 
the basis of similarities that we suppose are significant for our particular purpose, while ignoring the 
differences which we assume to be of little relevance for that purpose (or which we simply fail to 
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notice), thus creating a domain which is broad but almost empty. Normally, there is some 
accommodation between these two principles; and all our representations are sub-systems which 
include both a few external connections and a few subdivisions within their components. Though 
each has a physical counterpart in the human brain, all categories are conceptually located in the 
space of representations, and may be manipulated without further reference to what they are 
deemed to represent. Such manipulations may be enlightening, or misleading; much depends on 
how they are used (Loasby 2003). 
 
As Hayek (1952, p. 176) pointed out, nothing can be recognised unless it can be assigned to 
some existing category; and all such categories are based on conjectural principles of selection. 
Perhaps the clearest, and prior, statement of this necessary principle of contextual similarity, and the 
implicit dangers of ignoring apparently irrelevant differences in favour of salient resemblances, was 
provided by Frank Knight (1921, p. 206). Hayek (1952, pp. 145-6) likewise emphasises that all 
classification must be based on selected elements, so that the resulting ‘system of acquired 
connexions … will give only a very distorted reproduction of the relationships’ which it purports to 
represent, and ‘will often prove to be false’, generating misleading expectations. Simon (1982, 2, 
pp. 306-7) similarly observes that because of the active filtering involved in both direct perception 
and the handling of information ‘the perceived world is fantastically different from the “real” 
world’. Such representations, and the procedures that are associated with them, necessarily have 
limited ranges of convenience (Kelly 1963), and are therefore always vulnerable to changes in the 
environment to which they are applied. Hence the importance of a procedure for revising, or even 
replacing, classifications which no longer seem to work, and of a strong intrinsic (and therefore 
genetic) motivation for doing so; such revisions are of course the means by which the physical order 
began to emerge from the sensory order, and new sciences emerged.  
 
The possibility of revision implies the ability to conceive of alternative principles of 
classification on which to construct representations – and the ability to accept them. As a clinical 
psychologist, Kelly was particularly concerned with the difficulties encountered by some people in 
preserving the coherence of their interpretative systems while making the adjustments necessary to 
maintain sufficient coherence with their changing external environment; and Smith and Marshall 
both recognized the tendency for the domain-limited systems of each individual to become more 
resistant to change, however desirable. Human communities may nevertheless escape, at least to 
some degree, the limitations of the individual. What is distinctive about our species is that the 
multifarious forms of the division of labour among its members have produced such an 
unprecedented variety of domain-limited representations and so have enormously increased the 
collective power of human intelligence and the total of human knowledge. Hayek’s account of the 
functioning of the human brain and neurocognitive theory both lead to the conclusion that human 
knowledge is necessarily dispersed and incomplete; furthermore, the particular potential and 
limitations of the human brain imply that knowledge can be less incomplete only if it is more 
dispersed. The implications for specifying the central problems of economics are not difficult to 
envisage. 
 
The division of labour exploits the ability of individuals to create domain-specific networks 
– if they are given the freedom to so. In currently-fashionable terminology that implies delegation 
and empowerment, or in economic language imperfectly-specified contracts; but the obverse of 
such discretion is loss of control, which to those concerned with the overall efficiency of allocation, 
either as analysts or policy-makers, appears to be a serious deficiency. The fundamental reason for 
this negative perception is the illusion that the system can be safely treated as if it were fully 
connected (Potts 2000); this is comparable to the illusion that the connective structure of the 
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greatly-enlarged human brain can be genetically specified. Both illusions exclude uncertainty; but 
in doing so they also exclude endogenous innovation. 
 
The incentive problems of dispersed knowledge, under the title of asymmetric information, 
have become a major focus of attention in economics, and that in itself is no bad thing; but because 
full specification (at least of all contingencies and their implications) is necessary for the calculation 
of system optima it is inevitable, though unfortunate, that such problems are treated as some kind of 
‘organisational failure’, rather than being part of the pathology of success. Kirzner, by contrast, has 
rightly insisted on differential alertness to opportunities, which may be explained by differential 
pattern formation, as an essential contributor to economic progress. One important consequence of 
this prevalent attitude is an implicit assumption that the co-ordination of dispersed knowledge is 
simple if incentives are entirely compatible, whereas there is abundant evidence of the major 
contribution of well-intentioned misunderstandings to many failures: for those of a generous 
disposition, economists’ recommendations to the transition economies of eastern Europe may be so 
classified. The apparently-analysable problems of information have diverted attention from the 
more fundamental issue of interpretation; asymmetric interpretation is at once a threat to co-
ordination, a basis for opportunism and a route to innovation. The recent growth of interest in 
‘knowledge management’ may provide an opportunity for a balanced analysis of the costs and 
benefits of the growth of knowledge, related to an understanding of the processes of this growth – 
but not if the management of knowledge is treated as primarily a problem of information 
technology. 
Economic growth and the growth of knowledge both entail the division of labour in order to 
achieve an effective allocation of resources to the development of appropriate domain-specific 
cognitive modules within the economy and within society – indeed within many kinds of ‘space’. 
As Darwin learnt from Smith, perhaps indirectly through Milne-Edwards, these are the advantages 
of the division of labour that have led biological evolution towards the variety of species; they have 
led human societies towards the variety of knowledge. The genetic specification of life forms has 
created many short-lived inefficient allocations of resources along the way, for only a very small 
proportion of all possible genetically-induced specialisations produce any advantages; but as Smith 
saw, the most important advantage of the division of labour is not its effective application of the 
differentiated knowledge and capabilities that are already available but the effects of specialisation 
on the generation of new knowledge and new capabilities, which also create many short-lived 
inefficient allocations of resources to unsuccessful novelties along the way to significant 
improvements. Our introductory survey of the psychology of wealth is sufficient to show that 
‘optimal allocations’ cannot be defined. The economy is an evolving system which is continually 
creating and modifying domain-specific modules of knowledge, and of productive organisations 
that are based on particular combinations of knowledge.  
The realisation of this potential would be very severely restricted if domain-specific 
modules could be created only by genetic mutations and natural selection among the variants that 
they produce. Much more can be achieved once genetic mutations (which cannot, of course, be 
contrived) begin to supplement the programming of behaviour with the potential to develop 
domain-specific programmes of behaviour within the individual brain; for this allows the division 
of labour to be extended and knowledge to be improved within a human lifetime – especially when 
an increase in brain size expands the range of possible connections. As in the economy, the 
realisation of this potential requires a relaxation of control; and it was therefore fortunate that the 
genome did not grow enough to permit an increase in genetic instructions to match the increase in 
brain size. The imperfectly-specified brain structure has similar merits to the imperfectly-specified 
contract of the Coasean firm and the imperfectly-specified activities of a Hayekian economy. The 
implications for the organisation of economic activity of the characteristics of the human mind 
provide tomorrow’s theme. 
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ORGANIZATION AND THE HUMAN MIND 
 
 







What bounds on rationality? 
 
  The twin foundational principles of this paper are that the structure and working of 
organisations reflect the characteristics of the human mind and that the analysis of organisations 
should respect this relationship. This presentation will accordingly draw primarily on the theories of 
the mind discussed in the preceding paper. However no analysis of organisation should ignore the 
work of Herbert Simon, and that is where I shall begin (using some passages from Loasby 2004). 
As we shall see, there is a substantive correspondence between Simon’s ideas and these earlier 
theories, beginning with a common focus on the interactions between structure and process.  
 
Simon is the most explicit about the methodological issue. 
 
Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda  
and informing our research methods than our view of the  
nature of the human beings whose behavior we are studying.  
                         Herbert Simon (1985, p. 303) 
 
This principle is, of course, applicable to the whole of economics, as to all attempts to study human 
behaviour; but it may be thought especially relevant to analyses of the organisation of economic 
activities, both designed and emergent, and to attempts to prescribe improvements in this 
organisation. It is important to add, as Simon did, that we need to consider human nature in its 
environment, both because of the evolutionary processes by which that environment has influenced 
human nature and because what kinds of behaviour and what kinds of organisation, among the 
repertoire of human possibilities, are likely to be effective naturally varies with circumstances. As 
shown in the preceding paper, the interaction between internal and external environment is the 
driver of Smith’s (1980 [1795]), Marshall’s (1994) and Hayek’s (1952) theories. 
 
  Simon’s ‘view of the nature of human beings’ is typically summarised as ‘bounded 
rationality’. For many economists this is interpreted as a peripheral irrationality which provides an 
error term in models of rational choice; its effects are therefore of secondary importance and may 
accordingly be left to psychologists and sociologists. A few economists, however, have found 
‘bounded rationality’, suitably domesticated, to be a convenient instrument for coping with 
particular anomalies within the theoretical system of modern economics. The most notable example, 
which is directly relevant to the present theme, is its invocation to explain the existence of firms in 
an analytical scheme which proceeds directly from data to an equilibrium allocation and therefore 
has no room for them. By combining opportunism with narrowly-specified restrictions on the 
ability of individuals to meet all the requirements of the standard model (such as debarring them 
from writing contracts that include all contingencies or from correctly observing all states of the 
world) it can be shown that the overall efficiency of outcomes may depend on who makes which 
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decisions. The restrictions are themselves so limited that their consequences are known to all 
relevant agents, and so one can deduce a rational choice equilibrium of property rights in which 
what is allocated is the right to take particular classes of decisions.  
 
This theory of property rights is offered as the rationale of the firm; the intellectual standing 
of its principal exponents has made it generally acceptable, although some leading theorists are still 
uneasy about the apparent compromise with methodological purity. Oliver Williamson’s theory also 
turns on the allocation of property rights, and has also gained considerable acceptance because it 
conforms to this format of an equilibrium of almost-perfectly rational agents; but his insistence on 
the importance of a hierarchy, within which post-contractual decisions can be enforced according to 
the terms of the contract, takes us beyond property rights towards the concept of firms as 
organisations, and is correspondingly less acceptable by modern standards of rigour. Nevertheless 
Williamson (e.g. 1997, p. 130) is himself insistent that firms are no more than a defence against 
opportunism and can exist only in circumstances when markets fail to offer protection – and 
moreover fail so badly as to outweigh the consequences of forgoing the ‘high-powered incentives’ 
that only markets can provide. In Williamson’s as in standard property-rights models, firms are not 
necessary for production, because production knowledge is available to all (Demsetz 1988, p. 150); 
they are incentive structures which ensure that the analysis of production remains within the 
established models of equilibrium, and is thereby insulated from bounded rationality. This 
separation helps to explain why even Williamson offers no theory of management; post-contract 
control is simply a set of instructions to subordinates that validate the rational expectations on 
which the governance system was based. There is no process.  
 
  This is some way from Simon’s ideas, as Williamson himself has recognised. Though he 
agrees with Simon that ‘the importance of intentional governance has been undervalued’ he 
immediately and explicitly dissociates himself from Simon’s (1991, p. 27) vision of an economy 
that is dominated by conscious organisation: ‘that we appear to be subject to intentional governance 
structures everywhere we turn is misleading: the real action is largely invisible’ (Williamson 1996, 
p. 145). Williamson has used the opening quotation of this paper to justify his own analysis; but the 
only aspect of human nature on which he relies is opportunism, and his repeated assertion that in the 
absence of opportunism there is no theoretical reason for the existence of firms reveals that his view 
of the nature of human cognition is identical to that which underlies rational choice theory; and that 
view has no distinctively human reference (Giocoli 2003). 
 
Economic theorists seem more concerned to save the theory than to understand the 
phenomena of business organisation; as we shall see this desire to preserve existing cognitive 
structures is a major influence on both individual and organisational behaviour – and in many other 
contexts. Even the exclusive focus on the internal consistency of models without regard for 
consistency between models and phenomena to which they might be applied, so incisively 
documented by Giocoli (2003), is by no means peculiar to economics. Nicolai Foss (2001) has 
pointed out that Williamson’s account of intentional governance, although allowing for superior-
subordinate relationships that are not encompassed by principal-agent models, provides a very 
‘thin’ theory of organisation, because it is based on a very ‘thin’ notion of bounded rationality. Foss 
is seeking something better; and he suggests that psychologists have supplied enough evidence of 
systematic patterns of behaviour that violate the standard rationality assumptions in orthodox 
economics to permit much ‘thicker’ theorising about organisational problems and organisational 
remedies. In addition to respecting Simon’s (1991, p. 43) call for ‘empirically sound theories’ 
which make some direct reference to evidence about human nature, this proposal has the substantial 
merit of suggesting a continuing role for managers within a firm: the establishment of a firm is not 
the end but the beginning of analysis, as Simon wished.  
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In one important respect, however, Foss’s proposal is still inadequate; it continues the 
established tradition of regarding firms as devices to protect against human inadequacies. If we 
wish to honour the memory of Herbert Simon (and also to improve our understanding of the 
working of economic systems and develop a better basis for policy recommendations) we should do 
better than that; and we should start, as Simon proposed, by taking a more careful look at the nature 
of human beings than most economists have been prepared to do in the past half-century. Our 
analysis should be based on an understanding of the distinctive capabilities, as well as the 
limitations, of the human mind. We may then observe that capabilities and inadequacies are often 
related. Indeed the systematic patterns of apparently ‘non-rational’ behaviour presented by Foss 
provide an immediate example, for they are pathologies of the particular evolved characteristics of 
human cognition which have valuable consequences. Many features of economic and social 
organisation may be explained as responses (often unintentional) to the potential as well as the 
pathology of this cognition. (That valuable characteristics are typically accompanied by their own 
particular pathologies is an example of the ubiquity of opportunity costs, which should be a key 
concept in evolutionary theories.) Organisation is much more than a response to either human or 
market failure – and much more than a means of optimisation. 
 
Integral and non-integral systems 
 
In the same year in which Debreu published his definitive analysis of general equilibrium, Simon 
observed of the choice-theoretic tradition in economics that  
 
when perception and cognition intervene between the decision-maker 
and his objective environment, this model no longer proves adequate.  
We need a description of the choice process that recognizes that  
alternatives are not given but must be sought; and a description that 
takes into account the arduous task of determining what consequences 
will follow on each alternative.  
(Simon 1959, p. 272) 
 
Jason Potts (2000) has recently emphasized the fundamental difference between these two 
conceptions of analysis. General equilibrium exists in integral space, which ensures that every 
element in the system is directly connected to every other element; thus every preference, resource, 
commodity, location, date and contingency enters directly into the determination of the solution for 
the system being modeled. In integral space there is no room for dense clusters of connections, such 
as those that constitute firms or markets. ‘Organization’ as a topic is undiscussable. 
 
Equilibrium allocations are derived from the data, and do not depend on rational choice by 
anyone within the system; from the perspective of economic theory, therefore, it is of no account 
that rational choice theory has so little relevance to the process of decision-making, with which 
Simon was concerned. Indeed, the role of economic agents, however rational, is incompatible with 
the concept of a fully-connected system; it is necessarily true that, as Frank Hahn (1984, p. 64) 
observed, ‘traditional economic theory does best when the individual has no importance – he is of 
measure zero’. Any interaction within a subset of agents implies non-integral space and highly 
selective connections, and therefore requires a different category of analysis. Whether a multitude 
of such local interactions replicates the deduced allocation is a question which cannot be properly 
formulated within the conventions of general equilibrium models, as Richardson (1960) 
demonstrated – not least because the concept of ‘time’ as a period during which these interactions 
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take place is categorically distinct from the concept of ‘time’ as a dimension of all goods which is 
embodied in the specification of the general equilibrium model.  
 
Perception and cognition have no usable meaning in integral space, since their significance 
is defined by the selectivity of the connections by which they are constituted.  In sharp contrast to 
the standard assumption that the information available to agents is always a partition of the full 
information set which corresponds precisely to the configuration of the economy, the selectivity of 
perception and cognition results from conjectures (rarely completely conscious) that are imposed on 
phenomena. It is not then surprising that ‘the decision-maker’s information about his environment is 
much less than an approximation to the real environment’ (Simon 1959, p. 272), especially when 
we recognize that the relevant ‘real environment’ is nothing less than the total system, including its 
structure of connections. ‘The decision-maker’s information’ itself rests on perceptions which are 
themselves structures of connections, and so the knowledge within an economy is always dispersed 
and incomplete, as Hayek insisted. That of, course, is why the performance of economic systems 
depends on the way that they are organized. What is crucial to our understanding of economic 
organization and economic development is that this dispersion and incompleteness is not simply a 
‘failure’, but a condition of success – because of the nature of human beings who, as explained in 
the previous presentation, are obliged to economise on cognition but are then able to use it to create 
new representations and new capabilities within particular domains.   
 
Rational choice theorists have preserved their conceptual system by endowing economic 
agents with ‘rational expectations’ which are the equivalent of the analyst’s integral model and even 
allow the set of agents to be collapsed into a single representative agent. The essential 
incompleteness of connections, which is the precondition of organisation – including the 
organisation of markets, which are a pure fiction in standard equilibrium  models – and the essential 
incompleteness of knowledge both require an analytical foundation in non-integral space. Simon 
(1991, p. 27) argues for ‘the ubiquity of organizations’: I suggest that we delete the final letter, and 
emphasize the ubiquity of organisation, because perception, cognition, and decision processes, for 
individuals as well as firms, are organizational phenomena. Methodological individualism should 
begin, not with preference sets and possibility sets, but with evolving cognitive structures. 
Connections matter (Loasby 2001). 
 
It is within non-integral space that we can begin to explore the implications of Marshall’s 
(1920, p. 138) linked principles: ‘Knowledge is our most powerful engine of production. … 
Organization aids knowledge’. (This passage dates from the fourth edition of 1898.) Simon’s (1991, 
p. 28) suggestion that ‘organizational economy’ is a more appropriate term than ‘market economy’ 
is powerfully reinforced by the recognition of the intimate connection between organisation and the 
knowledge on which an economy – especially a modern economy – depends. This connection also 
suggests that the familiar contrast between ‘firm’ and ‘market’ may be misleading; in addition to 
the variety of intermediate relationships to which Richardson (1972) drew attention, there are 
‘market’ elements within many firms, and ‘markets’, like firms, are important features of 
organisation. The multiplicity of markets reflects the advantages of specialization in the 
organisation of particular kinds of transactions, where the classification of transactions is the 
product of human minds and continues to evolve as a product of experience and imagination. 
Markets rest on institutions (Ménard 1995), which emerge from human behavior, both conscious 
and unconscious; as Schumpeter (1934) and Casson (1982) noted, they may be the focus of 
entrepreneurial actions. Both firms and markets are structures that facilitate human interaction by 
reducing transaction costs through various kinds of investment, and the flexibility of both depends 
on imperfect specification. 
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Why should organisation aid knowledge? The essential point is that knowledge itself is 
organisation: ‘Whatever we call reality, it is revealed to us only through the active construction in 
which we participate’ (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 293). As Simon (1959, p. 273) observes, if 
perception is a filter, then ‘the filtering is not merely a passive selection … but an active process 
involving attention to a very small part of the whole and exclusion, from the outset, of almost all 
that is not within the scope of attention’. The possibility of establishing ‘true knowledge’ on an 
undisputable basis, either axiomatic or empirical, was conclusively refuted by David Hume (if not 
earlier); and in the preceding paper we saw how Hume’s friend Adam Smith (1980 [1795]) 
produced a remarkable psychological theory of the development of human, and eventually 
scientific, knowledge as a work of human imagination by which order was imposed on otherwise 
unaccountable phenomena through the invention of ‘connecting principles’. Because, to use Karl 
Popper’s term, all knowledge consists of conjectures, it is always liable to be confronted with 
anomalies; and a persistent failure to accommodate anomalies provides powerful psychological 
incentives to invent a new set of principles that will restore the comfort of understanding. The 
increasing focus on incentives within economics has not yet encompassed these particular 
motivations, which seem to be no less powerful than opportunism, and no less significant in their 
effects.  
 
From rationality to cognition 
 
I am afraid we must conclude that, in relation to conventional economics, ‘bounded 
rationality’ is not a good label for the view of human nature on which Simon wished to base his 
analysis, because it has been interpreted as an occasional and strictly limited exception to the norm 
of unbounded rationality, which might be useful in resolving some awkward anomalies such as the 
existence of firms. Even Foss’s proposal to make use of the evidence of psychologists seems to 
suggest that firms exist in order to cope with a well-defined class of systematic departures from a 
norm of strictly rational behaviour. But if the adjective is unfortunate, so is the noun; for once we 
accept that rationality is bounded, the economic concept of ‘rationality’ is insufficient, and 
‘optimality’ is simply not good enough. Quite different cognitive skills are now required. (For a 
discussion of such skills, see Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), who emphasise the efficacy of 
‘boundedly rational’ heuristics.) Therefore instead of thinking only about remedies for particular 
deficiencies of rationality we should turn our attention to the means of exploiting the remarkable 
human cognitive skills of classifying and connecting phenomena and ideas, which Adam Smith 
identified as the prime instruments of both scientific and economic progress.  
 
As is well known, Simon gained early inspiration from Chester Barnard; and Barnard had 
very clear views on the relationship between human nature and the environment. In a lecture on 
‘Mind in human affairs’, printed as an appendix to The Functions of the Executive, he emphasised 
the importance of such skills in the many situations in which there was no adequate basis for logical 
operations.  ‘Much of the error of historians, economists and all of us in daily affairs arises from 
imputing logical reasoning to men who could not or cannot base their actions on reason’ (Barnard 
1938, p. 305) – because, even if the logic is impeccable the premises are typically ambiguous, 
erroneous or incomplete (Barnard 1938, p. 304). ‘The correctness of such decisions must, therefore, 
depend upon the effectiveness of the mental processes of the type that can handle contingencies, 
uncertainties and unknowables’ (Barnard 1938, p. 312). Logical reasoning has a role in these 
processes, by identifying implications and inconsistencies, but they require a human mind which 
cannot be represented adequately as a general purpose information processor, but one which 
operates within particular localised frameworks and uses particular criteria, all developed within 
particular environments (as discussed in the preceding presentation). As Barnard (1938, pp. 301-2) 
observes, this creates difficulties in adjusting to new kinds of work, however complete the advance 
  29 
provision of knowledge, and in achieving understanding between persons or groups. Barnard cites 
his own experience in moving between jobs, but such difficulties arise whenever there are attempts 
to reorient well-established businesses. These cognitive and organisational problems provide a 
rationale for Schumpeter’s initial association of entrepreneurship with outsiders.  
 
The switch from rationality to cognition entails, I believe, a shift of emphasis from symbol 
processing, on which Simon focused his attention by way of computer models of artificial 
intelligence, to pattern-making and pattern-using. Symbol-processing has the dual virtues of 
directing our thoughts to how problems are handled and reminding us that our mental processes 
necessarily take place in the space of representations, and not in the space of real-world phenomena. 
The correspondence between the two spaces (which Popper called World 3 and World 1) is 
problematic, and may be extraordinarily flimsy. Simon was well aware of the importance and the 
fallibility of representations, more aware than politicians, business strategists and economists often 
seem to be. However, I suggest that the most promising approach to understanding representations 
is not by modelling humans as analytic engines but through the human facility for pattern-making, 
by which representations are created. (The substantial precedents created by economists for this 
approach provided the basis for yesterday’s presentation.) This leads us to recognise the importance 
of locally-connected systems rather than a general processing capability. A recognition that all 
decisions are necessarily ‘framed’ will allow us to understand Foss’s examples as part of the 
pathology of a capability that can also be remarkably effective, and to incorporate Foss’s proposal 
into a balanced appraisal of organisations as structures which may help to realise cognitive potential 
while combating cognitive error and opportunism – and, of course, which often fail to do so.  
 
George Kelly’s (1963) Theory of Personality is remarkably similar to Adam Smith’s theory 
of science and to Shackle’s (1967) reinvention of the latter. A ‘sense of order and consistency’ 
(Shackle 1967, p. 286) is a psychological necessity, and this order must be created by the human 
imagination. Experience is not a sequence of events, but is constituted by the order that is imposed 
on them (Kelly 1963, pp. 72-4): thus a sequence of events may constitute different experiences for 
different observers. Kelly (1963, p. 8), like Simon, insists that perceptions are themselves ‘entirely 
real’, and have real and analysable consequences. (Giocoli (2003) argues that the perceptions of 
economists – paradoxically including the perception that all human mental processes must be 
internally consistent, implying that Kelly’s (1963) concerns are illegitimate – have had major 
consequences for the development of economics.)  
 
For Kelly as for Smith, time is fundamental, because time brings change. We make patterns 
of what we think might be viable subsystems, and use them as heuristics, both for action and for 
absorbing (or adapting) new knowledge. All heuristics are limited in their applicability, and these 
limitations carry the potential for systematic error, especially when faced with novelty – which may 
not be recognised as novelty. A substantial degree of decomposability, as Simon insisted, is 
essential, but decomposability tends to degrade with time, as Kelly and Marshall both recognised; 
and ‘time provides the ultimate bond in all relationships’ (Kelly 1963, p. 6) – but not as 
domesticated within an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Local patterns provide local structures within 
which to think and act; but compatability between patterns that may be juxtaposed is also a 
psychological need. The search for compatability may be a major stimulus to the creation of new 
knowledge and new skills; but individual failure to achieve or maintain internal coherence may be 
disastrous, paralysing action and even leading to mental breakdown, which was Kelly’s professional 
concern. As we shall see, these human characteristics are significant in explaining the organisation 
of economic activities,  and also in explaining organisational pathologies, from systematic 
weaknesses to ultimate collapse, as we have seen in individual businesses, industrial districts, and 
economic systems. 
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Making patterns, in the form of grouping phenomena according to some principle of 
similarity while ignoring differences in other respects, was identified by Knight (1921, p. 206) as a 
condition of intelligent behaviour in an uncertain world. (On one occasion when I was explaining 
Knight’s principle, one member of the audience commented that this behaviour was better described 
as ‘sane’, rather than ‘intelligent’; this perceptive comment links Knight’s analysis precisely to 
Kelly’s.) Unlike Knight, Simon never sought to base his approach on fundamental uncertainty; he 
was content to rely on the interaction between complexity and human limitations to generate 
endogenous uncertainty. That allowed him to demonstrate that even in situations – notably when 
playing chess – for which it can be demonstrated that there is in principle a correct procedure, and 
therefore no intrinsic uncertainty in Knight’s sense, there is nevertheless no possibility of 
formulating this correct procedure, and players must find their own guidelines. This demonstration 
may be thought of as the equivalent of a victory when playing away; however, such ‘certainty in 
principle’ invites representation as unqualified certainty, or well-defined risk (which immediately 
rules Simon’s match-winning goal offside), within a model that serves what Shackle (1967, p. 288) 
called ‘the chief service’ of a theory in offering protection from ‘the uneasy consciousness of 
mystery and a threatening unknown’. Knightian uncertainty cannot be so represented, though it may 
be, and has been, denied or ignored; it also has the particular advantage, emphasised by Knight, of 
providing theoretical space for entrepreneurship.  
 
If there are no demonstrably correct procedures for making decisions, then the decisions 
themselves cannot be predicted  without some knowledge of the procedures which are being 
followed by the decision makers, and nor can the actions which they initiate. Individuals matter, 
because the individual organisation of knowledge influences both actions and the development of 
knowledge. An inescapable consequence is that it is impossible to be certain about the decisions of 
others that may affect the outcome of a choice that one is about to make. Thus decision-making 
systems, such as firms, require to be organised, and we are therefore directed towards Simon’s 
theme of the decision premises and procedures by which this is done, and the influences on the 
quality of the decisions that emerge from them, broadened to incorporate linkages between 
decision-making systems (for example within networks of firms) and more generally to the role of 
institutions and informal organisation (which was emphasised by Barnard) in channelling 
behaviour. Organisations (of many kinds) and institutions matter, because they provide a (fallible) 
basis for securing compatability between their members.  
 
We are also directed towards a second theme, which is much more closely associated with 
George Shackle, though it is clearly foreshadowed by Knight’s insight that uncertainty is the 
precondition of entrepreneurship. Opportunities as well as contingencies and interdependencies may 
be unknown; where there are no demonstrably correct procedures there is scope for novelty, and 
thus for the generation of variety that is essential to any continuing process of evolution. Coping 
with uncertainty merges into ‘the general problem of management’ (Knight 1921, p.  259), which in 
the end cannot be separated from enterprise – as Marshall insisted, in accordance with his own 
theory of the human mind (Marshall 1994). Knight’s focus on the indispensability of procedures 
that rely on problematic categories even supplies a theoretical basis for Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship as a vision of new combinations – each of which is essentially an organisational 
problem, first within the brain and subsequently within the economy. Shackle’s contribution is the 
importance of imagination as the counterpart of uncertainty, though we should not forget the central 
role of imagination in Adam Smith’s (1980 [1795]) account of the growth of knowledge. Simon’s 
own insistence that the range of alternatives between which people choose is a product of the 
decision process leaves ample scope for imagination; and people differ in their capacity for 
imagination and in the particular connections that they make.  
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For a link between Shackle and Simon we cannot do better than to cite Shackle’s (1969, p. 
224) proposition: ‘The boundedness of uncertainty is essential to the possibility of decision’. My 
own view is that ‘bounded uncertainty’ rather than ‘bounded rationality’ is the right end from which 
to start. Our systems of thought set fallible bounds to uncertainty: they are not simplifications of 
known complexities, but have to be created by our own imagination. Organisations likewise set 
bounds to uncertainty both for the organisation as a whole and for its subdivisions – or, to be more 
precise, for the individuals who have responsibilities for the system and its subsystems, and they do 
so according to Knight’s principle of supposedly-relevant similarities. It is because we all need such 
bounds that we commonly observe, as Simon noted, members of an organisation internalising 
decision premises that are supplied by that organisation (and which may even have been formulated 
by people who have long departed); this need crowds out a good deal of opportunism. Witt (1999) 
has suggested that the creation and maintenance of compatible interpretations within a firm is a 
major entrepreneurial role. Since there is no demonstrably correct procedure for determining the 
bounds of uncertainty it is not surprising that there will typically be some variation, even between 
organisations that are apparently engaged in similar activities; such intra-industry variation was 
Marshall’s distinctive complement, inspired by Darwin, to Smith’s (1976b [1776]) principle of the 
division of labour, and it was presented, not as a sign of remediable inefficiency, but as a source of 
progress. 
 
From individual to organisation 
 
The total knowledge and skill, and the particular content of knowledge and skill, that is available to 
a society, depends on the way in which the potential for development at the level of the individual is 
organised within the economy. The psychology of wealth leads to a particular perspective on this 
problem of organisation. We can see at once that it requires a balance between apparently 
conflicting principles: the coherence, and therefore the effectiveness, of this differentiated system 
requires some degree of compatability between its elements, but the creation of differentiated 
knowledge and skills depends on the freedom to make idiosyncratic patterns by thinking and acting 
in ways which may be radically different from those of many other people. The relative importance 
of compatability and independence, of course, varies enormously across an economic system, and 
so any tolerably successful system requires a combination of many different kinds of balance. The 
drastically simplified categories of ‘firms’ and ‘markets’ do at least recognise the need for the co-
existence of arrangements that emphasise independence and arrangements that emphasise co-
ordination; but each category contains many different degrees and kinds of balance between the 
two, and there are also many arrangements that do not fit easily into either, as Richardson (1972) 
pointed out. Richardson also showed how to make sense of this multiplicity of arrangements by 
analysing the interplay of degrees and kinds of similarity and complementarity between the 
capabilities (which we may think of as patterns of selected connections) that are required in any 
modern system of production.  
 
  In considering how one might effectively organise activities which are to be controlled by 
many brains, it is helpful to identify some principles which are common to the structure and 
working of the brain and of organisations: and we can do this by drawing on the preceding 
presentation. The natural starting-point for an economist is the importance of economising on what 
we may call ‘the costs of running the system’; the phrase is adopted from Kenneth Arrow, who 
unfortunately has not given much thought to the costs of running mental systems. These costs 
impose a requirement to be highly selective in forming connections and thereafter in relying on 
them, within individual brains, formal organisations, and economic systems (a requirement which 
was ignored in turn by advocates of central planning and of supposedly pure market systems); they 
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also imply an essential complementarity (as well as conflict) between routine and innovation, to 
which we will return very shortly. This commonality of problems can in the end be traced back to 
the simple fact that the formation and the functioning of social organisations (unlike chemical 
compounds) is strictly (though not exclusively) dependent on the behaviour of the human beings 
that contribute to their formation and their operation, behaviour which in turn is strictly (though not 
exclusively) dependent on the functioning of the human brain.  
 
  We will now briefly consider some of the issues that arise from this cognitive 




A fundamental characteristic of the cognitive theory underlying this presentation is the 
intimate dependence of all change on the absence of change. Systematic development is impossible 
unless there is a stable baseline from which to begin and a stable environment against which options 
may be assessed, and which  may give direction to deliberate attempts to generate conjectures. 
Smith’s (1980 [1795]) psychological theory was illustrated by the history of astronomy, for which 
the heavens provided a stable environment, subject to improving techniques of observation; and the 
sequence of robust interpretative systems examined by Smith resulted from the rearrangement of 
‘connecting principles’. When, two centuries later, Kuhn (1962, 1970) produced a theory of 
scientific development, it was in most respects remarkably close to Smith’s, and also illustrated by 
the history of astronomy; but Smith, unlike Kuhn, took care to explain the continuity that underlay 
the apparent discontinuities of theory.  
 
Routines stabilise evolved patterns, thus releasing mental energy and providing a basis for 
experiment; this interplay between routine and innovation, within an individual, a firm, an industry, 
and an economy, is a pervasive theme in Marshall’s economics (Raffaelli 2003). Thus a sensible 
use of the concept of equilibrium is to enquire which elements of a system stand in an equilibrium 
relationship to each other; for these equilibrium relationships provide the foundations of change. 
Marshall’s period analysis relies on period-specific equilibrium relationships to explain period-
specific adjustments. A natural consequence of this dependence of innovation on stability (which is 
also essential to neo-Darwinian theory) is a substantial degree of path-dependency within each 
cognitive domain – including that of a whole economy, as is indicated by Marshall’s (1919) surveys 
of national systems; but this tendency is partially offset by the variety and the quasi-independence 
of domains – another consequence of the combined effects of cognitive limitations and the division 
of labour. The maintenance of stable baselines within particular domains is a prime function of 
formal organisations, and the appropriateness of the baseline is a major determinant of 




The universal importance of limited domains (in contrast to general equilibrium) is a key 
concept in the analysis of individual cognition, and therefore in economic organisation. Domain-
specificity, the usual label, is misleading, because the term suggests too narrow a range and far too 
much precision. Although some domains are both narrow and well-defined, usually there is some 
breadth of application and the limits are not well understood (as Knight and Hayek, for example, 
make clear in writing of the fallible bases of categorisation). We may recall from our previous 
excursion into biological evolution that the genome appears to have evolved as a method of 
constructing a system of domain-specific elements, embodying Smith’s principle of the division of 
labour; but the remarkable enlargement of the human brain led to a partial but significant movement 
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away from genetically-determined domain-specificity within the brain towards a genetically-
enabled potential for developing domain-limited processes at the level of the individual, as 
suggested by Karmiloff-Smith and her associates. Though such individual development may simply 
modify genetically-endowed patterns, it may also lead, as Hayek argued, to the creation of novel – 
and additional – patterns of connections within the brain, such as those that constitute the physical 
order; and these patterns are produced, as Smith and Shackle notably emphasised, by the human 
imagination, which operates at the second level of Marshall’s ‘machine’. Though the results of 
genetic evolution are still pervasive, there are now significant possibilities for development at the 
level of the individual to modify, and even sometimes to override, development at the level of the 
human species. 
 
The evidence on facial recognition (Karmiloff-Smith 2002) presented in the preceding paper 
is particularly relevant at this point. The motivation to recognize faces is, we may presume, a shared 
genetic endowment – its advantages in the formation of human society (including its importance in 
controlling opportunism) are obvious; but it is not linked to a unique facial module.  Recalling that 
recognition by feature is always employed by those affected by the Williams Syndrome, but also by 
those not so affected when they are presented with inverted faces, we may identify recognition by 
feature as the default mode; configural recognition is employed by those who have the requisite 
capability and have also been presented with the material that is necessary to build patterns. Pattern-
making is an inherited capacity, which may therefore be impaired by a genetic disorder; how that 
capacity is used depends on the environment and individual attempts to make sense of it. The use of 
different procedures for upright and inverted faces is also a demonstration that domains of 
application may become very specific through development; few people encounter inverted faces 
frequently enough to build appropriate patterns by which to identify them, but experiments with 
inverting spectacles have shown that it can be done. There is a familiar economic principle at work 
here; investment in developing the skill of configural recognition within a specific domain, such as 
inverted faces, is not justified if this skill is very rarely used.  
 
Developed capabilities are configurations that economise on cognition by the creation of 
cognitive capital that is appropriate to particular fields; Marshall (1920, p. 251) explains how 
someone who has learnt to skate can employ that routinised knowledge as a unit in constructing 
more elaborate figures, and the release of mental energy by the development of automatic 
connections becomes the operating principle that generates the benefits of an appropriately-
organized division of labour. Smith showed how human motivation could guide this investment of 
rather general pattern-making skills in domain-limited configural capabilities, drawing his examples 
from the physical order; and Ziman (2000, p. 120) points out that ‘pattern recognition is deeply 
embedded in scientific practice’, noting that the construction, use and modification of such patterns 
within each scientific field is a particular (we may say domain-limited) application of a universal 
and inter-subjective human capability. Even skills of integration across domains are themselves 
domain-limited; for each individual, as the careers of ‘Schumpeterian’ entrepreneurs have shown, 
they are normally restricted to particular categories of ‘distant and dissimilar objects’.  
 
The mental orders that are created by our imagination and tested in particular domains 
(ranging from very carefully controlled experimental settings to casual application – which may 
itself be very local or a broad commitment) are themselves forms of organisation, for all knowledge 
is a structure of selected connections. Now although much of our ‘life-world knowledge … is coded 
organically into our behaviour, genetic make-up and bodily form’ (Ziman 2000, p. 299), the mental 
orders generated by the imagination vary greatly across individuals; and this variation may be 
decisively influenced by created as well as natural environments. Education in any scientific 
discipline is intended to produce such influence; so is any commercial organisation. Consequently 
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the knowledge available in any human society depends on organisation – which means on particular 
patterns of connections – of the kinds listed by Marshall; these exploit the advantages of similarity 
(which depend not on total homogeneity but on local variation within imperfectly-specified 
patterns, as in genetic modifications) and of differentiation, which can produce new species of 
knowledge incomparably faster than genetic evolution. The distribution and selective connection of 
domain-limited modules within the economy is a central issue for explaining economic 
development and for effective policy at the level of firms and governments.  
 
It is important that the resulting knowledge-domains should also be imperfectly specified. In Nelson 
and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary theory, the primary units of evolution are skills, including skills 
of organisation, which are treated as cognitive programmes of limited scope; but Nelson and Winter 
take care to emphasise and to illustrate how ambiguous this scope may be, and use this ambiguity 
within their theory. Imperfect specification is also a condition of those experiments at the margin, 
inspired by differences of temperament and interpreted experience, on which Marshall relied for the 
variations that were ‘a chief cause of progress’ (Marshall 1920, p. 355), and it is essential for 
Penrose’s (1959, 1995) central notion of the imagination of new services to be obtained from 
resources and of new productive opportunities to which these services may be directed.  
 
Since increasing attention is being paid to the knowledge content of capital (of which Marshall was 
very well aware), it may be helpful to apply to structures of knowledge Lachmann’s (1978) analysis 
of capital goods: they are substitutable between uses but within each use they are complementary to 
a particular set of other capital goods when combined in a specific way; in other words they are 
multi-specific. Lachmann’s warning also applies: just as the value of capital cannot be maintained 
simply by maintaining the current set of combinations, so the value of knowledge cannot be 
maintained simply by perpetuating its current uses. It is indeed a most important characteristic of 
knowledge that it can be reused, but in a way that is not simply deducible from current uses – a 
consideration which is not prominent in endogenous growth theory, because it is not easily 
accommodated within the system of thought to which that theory belongs. Imagination (which 
Lachmann rated almost as highly as Shackle) is the genetically-derived device by which genetic 
evolution allows the human species to exceed the limits of genetic evolution. 
 
The necessity of operating within limited domains is clear; and so are the advantages that 
result. However, economists should never forget opportunity costs. There are important 
disadvantages of domain-limited patterns at all levels. Though it is perhaps somewhat easier to 
escape from internally-generated patterns of thought and action than from those that are genetically 
determined, it is nevertheless true, as the studies reported by Karmiloff-Smith (2002) confirm, that 
patterns resulting from development become increasingly rigid. The reconstruction of a personality 
to match a drastically-reorganised environment is a formidable challenge. (As a problem for clinical 
psychologists, it stimulated Kelly’s (1963) Theory of Personality). Changing the patterns of all the 
members of a group in a way that preserves intra-group compatability while adjusting to a different 
environment is even more difficult; reconstructing an organisation, formal or formal, of any size 
seems to be impossible without making some, often substantial, changes in its membership. 
Penrosian firms, like individual entrepreneurs, may find that nothing fails like success, because 
success may entrench belief in the patterns that appear to have produced it. The coherence of larger 
societies may depend on moderating the demands for compatability; for although, as Ziman (2000, 
p. 121) observes, the world-wide appeal of some soap operas indicates the similarity of evolved 
mental and emotional mechanisms, the power of genetics is being continually attenuated by 
individual and social developments which, though genetically enabled, are not genetically 
controlled.      
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Co-ordination and purpose 
 
The counterpart of quasi-independence is the problem of co-ordination, which arises in two 
forms: the compatability of separately-produced knowledge, and its comprehensibility to those who 
have not participated in its production. The division of labour offers to the innovator the protection 
of cognitive distance; the integration of what has been divided requires cognitive proximity. We 
still feel the effects of our shared genetic inheritance, which extends beyond the substantial 
component of programmed behaviour to the shared procedures by which our interpretative 
frameworks are formed (Ziman 2000, p. 121); and Smith’s (1976a [1759]) hopes for a civil society 
rested substantially on his argument that our common heritage allowed us to understand and 
appraise the behaviour of others in situations that were different from our own. Since then, 
however, social and economic evolution, based on an inherited capacity to create differentiated 
patterns, has increased the variety of situations and increased the possibilities of juxtaposing 
interpretative frameworks that have few elements or connections in common. Development within 
the individual dilutes the shared genetic inheritance of domain-specific behaviours; cultural 
evolution, in particular, may serve either to reinforce or to override the similarities of attitudes and 
behaviour embedded in humans on which both Smith and Hayek relied. 
 
Kelly (1963) construes human personality in terms of the interpretative frameworks that 
guide each person’s understanding and behaviour; and the failure to achieve an acceptable 
coherence between interpretative frameworks in a changing environment thus becomes Kelly’s 
construction of a personal breakdown. In an organisational context, this analysis can easily be 
extended to include problems of incompatability between the frameworks which seem to apply in 
the work environment and those with which each worker is comfortable in other parts of life, and 
also to problems of incompatability between the changes of framework that seem to be required in 
different parts of the organisation to cope with major changes in the organisation’s environment. ‘A 
breakdown of corporate personality’ may be an appropriate way to describe what has happened to 
many organisations (including the Soviet Union). 
 
We should remember, however, that compatability may be necessary in only a few 
dimensions, and systems may sometimes be sufficiently connected along the dimensions where it is 
most readily achieved (Ziman 2000, pp. 302-6). Success may depend both on bringing some people 
together and keeping others apart; and this may sometimes require the redefinition of organisational 
boundaries, both internal and external, as Allyn Young (1928) argued. Richardson’s (1972) analysis 
of capabilities along the dimensions of similarity and complementarity provides a basis for such 
redefinition.  Adaptability – the capacity to modify connections – is preserved, and sometimes 
enhanced, by rearranging the connections between units or between levels. Such rearrangements 
may increase independence or exploit complementarities, thus redefining the cognitive unit, though 
not without creating new problems.  
 
  Coase (1937) explained the firm as a set of incompletely-specified contracts which provided 
resources to be deployed at some date yet to be chosen and within a domain that could be broadly 
envisaged, thus avoiding the cost and time of making the necessary arrangements at that date; it is 
an investment in creating capabilities that provide options. Flexibility is preserved by the 
incomplete specification of both contracts and capabilities. Firms therefore require a combination of 
discretion and purpose – the scope for choice, and the capability and will to take good decisions and 
make them effective. This, of course, is Cattaneo’s psychology of wealth; it is not what is now 
presented as rational choice. It requires appropriate knowledge and capabilities, both direct and 
indirect (the latter incorporating how to access and interpret other people’s knowledge and how to 
get things done by other people). It also requires the appropriate premises and procedures for 
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making decisions, which normally include the appropriate decomposition of objectives and their 
distribution across individuals. Purpose is related to strategy in the old military sense of a vision of 
what is to be achieved, a set of assumptions on which action is to be based, and a set of principles to 
guide a sequence of decisions. This is very different from the degenerate sense of the term in game 
theory, in which strategy is degraded to a completely-specified plan. Plans are contingent schemes 
to implement strategy (and game theory might be used in the process of planning), but as 
Clausewitz observed no plan survives contact with the battle. A sound strategy, however, may 
survive to guide a succession of plans. 
 
    A Coasean firm is a combination of purpose and capabilities which retains sufficient 
degrees of freedom to allow people to take decisions that may make a difference. Like knowledge, 
decision spaces are representations which have to be created, by defining boundaries and selecting 
connections across those boundaries and between the elements within the space. This is Simon’s 
view of organisations as decision-making systems. There is no procedure which can ensure that 
decision spaces are correctly defined, and there must be some possibility of modifying them; 
however, although the distinction is fuzzy, it is generally convenient to take separate account of 
management within decision spaces, together with the maintenance of these spaces, and their 
redefinition, whether through internal initiative or in response to the pressure of events. This 
distinction resembles that between detailed and architectural change in contemporary writing on 
strategy and management, and it may be applied not only to a single firm but also to networks or 
clusters of firms. A similar distinction may be applied to the organisation of knowledge, and 
changes in the architecture of knowledge may lead to changes in the architecture of both firms and 
industries. Pharmaceuticals and telecommunications are prominent current examples, and both 
demonstrate (as have many previous examples) that matching new structures of knowledge with 
new organisation is not a simple business. The limited domain-relevance of cognitive structures, 
compatability between domain-limited structures, and the appropriate kinds and degrees of 
discretion are all likely to be problematic.   
 
Economic organisation, however it is arrived at, creates multiple frameworks for the 
division of labour in decision-making and in productive activities (which themselves, as 
Schumpeter (1934, p. 20) pointed out, entail the making of decisions). The fundamental allocation 
problem is who does what, and within what constraints.  
The ‘who’, the ‘what’ and the constraints all contribute to the shaping of patterns of behaviour, 
which in turn lead to changes in economic organisation. If we focus on formal organisation, then the 
boundaries between firms and their internal structure have major implications for what get to be 
defined as issues for attention, who deals with them, by what processes and using what premises for 
reasoning and what criteria for choice, how these choices are implemented (and how they are 
modified during the implementation), what checks are made on the outcomes, and what notice is 
taken of the results. External boundaries should be drawn so as to leave outsiders free to develop 
their own distinctive patterns when these are needed to provide a firm with appropriate knowledge 
or appropriate capabilities. All these elements contribute to influencing whether there will be 
innovations in product or process and, if so, what forms these innovations take.  
 
A firm is a sense-making system (Nooteboom 2001, p. 43); what sense it makes depends on 
how it separates and connects its ways of organising, creating, and using knowledge, for different 
structures have different implications, not only for protecting against opportunism but more 
importantly for creating useful knowledge. Formal organisation is an imposed order, which creates 
an environment for further order, both as predictable behaviour and as new structures of knowledge. 
This is a path-dependent process, but it is not path-determined; movement is easiest to adjacent 
states, but typically there are many states that are adjacent to each current position (Potts 2000), so 
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that even individuals or organisations with identical current positions may develop in different 
ways. In practice, individuals and firms will not have identical positions, even those with similar 
experiences and engaged in similar businesses, and this increases the potential for variation, as 
Marshall noted.  
 
Organisational design exists in the space of representations; it rests on conjectures (often 
implicit) about the similarity and complementarity of activities to be undertaken. No organisational 
structure can be best for all that it does or for all the problems and opportunities that it faces; 
organisation provides structure for trial and error processes, but is itself subject to trial and error, 
with a mixture of conscious design and unintended consequences, which may be beneficial, 
harmful, or simply unexpected. The future manifestations of this never-ending sequence, which was 
most forcefully described by Allyn Young (1928), cannot be predicted because they depend on 
knowledge that has not yet been created; and so the efficiency of an organisation, defined as the 
ability to adapt to or exploit future events, can at best be defined as a region (Potts 2000, p. 95) 





  So far our discussion of the relationship between organisations and the human brain has 
excluded (apart from passing references) what many people may think is the missing link between 
the two: institutions. Now I certainly agree that any comprehensive treatment of economic 
organisation must give a great deal of space to institutions; but, in accordance with a theme of these 
presentations, I am being highly selective in making connections, and inviting discussants and 
members of the audience to fill in some of the gaps. However, I now wish to suggest how 
institutions may be brought into the analysis by relating them directly to the individual. If we think 
of institutions as ‘the rules of the game’, or slightly more precisely as indicating the premises and 
procedures for deciding what to do, then we can see that this definition can be applied directly to 
the way in which the developed brain functions according to the ideas of Smith, Marshall, Hayek 
and Kelly. We may also agree that these premises and procedures are partly genetically determined 
but in substantial degree installed during the development process of each individual. The origin of 
the cognitive role of institutions, as premises and procedures, is therefore to be found in the 
development of the individual brain.  
 
Now, as we have seen, the characteristics of the human brain limit the internal creation of 
premises and procedures, but these characteristics also allow them to be imported from others, 
either by observation or direct instruction. Moreover, we seem to be quite strongly motivated to 
seek guidance from others. This motivation may be genetically determined, and could have been 
selected at the level of the species because it accelerates development at the level of the individual. 
Socialisation could not be as effective as it often is if it were solely dependent on pressure (though 
in some circumstances there may be formidable pressure); it is often readily acceptable, and 
sometimes actively sought. For example, some people are very keen to learn how to behave like an 
economist. 
 
  Although there seems to be no reason to reject a substantial genetic influence, the 
widespread sharing of particular domain-relevant premises and procedures may therefore be 
substantially explained by individual cognitive needs. (The argument was developed by Choi 1993.) 
This propensity to share for individual purposes provides a natural basis for managing interactions; 
indeed some interactions, as we have just noted, are prompted by the desire to acquire better 
cognitive skills. Furthermore the experience of managing interactions by the application of 
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previously-developed principles could suggest how other kinds of interactions might be managed by 
developing new institutions, which could often be modifications of established individual practices, 
and also foster the belief that agreement on how to think about matters of common – or even 
potentially conflicting – interest might well be beneficial. This sequence also suggests how people 
might contrive to choose between alternative equilibria, because it tends to generate shared notions 
of saliency. 
 
  The creation of organisations would be extremely difficult without the pre-existence of 
institutions to supply some initial premises and procedures which need not be discussed in the 
process of organisation-building; and indeed there is clear evidence of the severe, and sometimes 
insuperable, problems that are readily generated by attempts to create organisations that bring 
together people who rely on very different institutional supports, because they come from very 
diverse professional, cultural or national backgrounds. Despite many years of organisation building 
within the European Union, such institutional differences continue to hinder agreement, most 
recently by prompting conflicting interpretations of how the recently-proposed new constitution 
may be expected to work. There is no possibility of resolving these difficulties by creating an 
organisation that will supersede the institutions; on the contrary, formal organisations define a 
privileged space for the evolution of institutions that will, it is hoped, be particularly appropriate 
within that space; and since evolution always start from what already exists, pre-organisational 
institutions are likely to have major influences on post-organisational developments. This is 
precisely the issue in interpreting the European constitution.  
 
  In a business organisation such difficulties are mitigated because membership is voluntary – 
at least in reasonably open economies that are not dominated by monopolies; and the effectiveness 
of a business is powerfully assisted by the development of locally-appropriate institutions within 
that business. That was the basic message of Peters and Waterman’s (1982) best-selling recipe for 
business success, and it is not invalidated by the subsequent discovery that the particular institutions 
on which some of their successful companies relied had ceased to be appropriate, because that is a 
danger with all institutions. As financial advisers warn us, in the small print, past performance is no 
guarantee of future success. Simon (1982 [1963], p. 399) observed that, because internal coherence 
may sometimes be more important than accuracy, ‘the procedures for fact finding and for 
legitimating facts may themselves be institutionalized’. Ziman (2000) observes that similar 
legitimisation is to be found in science. It may be helpful to recall that the proceedings of learned 
societies were often published under the title of ‘Transactions’; the development, exchange, and 
application of knowledge within any working group is facilitated by a shared understanding of the 
procedural rationality of that group. Within a firm, this procedural rationality, which is inter-
subjective, may be partly shaped by the senior executives – Witt (1999) identifies it as a crucial 
entrepreneurial function; but it also, and sometimes primarily, reflects the informal organisation that 
develops within any formal organisation; the contributions of both formal and informal organisation 
to the effectiveness – and sometimes the ineffectiveness – of every business receive due attention in 
Barnard’s (1938) analysis of management. This is an essential part of firm-specific capital. 
 
It is a major function of institutions to maintain coherence within groups by legitimating particular 
facts, interpretations, procedures, and criteria, and individuals are generally disposed to accept such 
legitimation as a scarcely dispensable aid to preserving the coherence of their own ideas and 
thought processes. Opportunism is a serious issue (and there is spectacular evidence that it is 
sometimes easier in organisations); but what also needs to be acknowledged and explained is the 
widespread willingness of people to internalise ‘a social prescription of some, but not all, of the 
premises that enter into an individual’s choice of behaviours’ (Simon 1982 [1958], p. 345). People 
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seek out such prescriptions in many contexts; it is not surprising that they do so within the 
organisations in which they work. The fundamental explanation, I suggest, lies in the human brain. 
 
 
Tacit knowledge and codification 
 
From institutions as premises and procedures that are rarely questioned there is a simple 
connection to the theme of tacit and codified knowledge, which may be illuminated by  Smith’s, 
Marshall’s, and Hayek’s theories. All the knowledge that is developed within Marshall’s first level 
is necessarily tacit, since there is no way in which it can be formally represented; though it is 
codified in the neural system, this code is not accessible to the brain by which it is governed. 
Anything in the environment which cannot be matched to the neural code cannot be recognised; 
within the human sensory order, infra-red light and ultrasound are simple examples. It is a crucial 
feature of Marshall’s model that the operations of the second level do not displace the operations of 
the first; they build upon and complement it, by highly-selective intervention; and the additional 
knowledge generated at the second level is installed and maintained at the first level, where it 
necessarily becomes tacit, although recodification is possible if the codebook is not lost. These 
features are not simply the product of Marshall’s fancy, even though his account is the product of 
his own brain, constructed from ideas supplied by Bain, Darwin, and Babbage, among others, as 
indicated in the previous presentation. Tacit knowledge must be the foundational knowledge within 
biological evolution, and both evolutionary principles and the importance of cognitive economy 
imply that it remains so in modern humans. Although codification offers a means of selective 
improvement in the quality of tacit knowledge, the economising imperative ensures that knowledge 
moves in both directions, as the philosopher A. N. Whitehead (1948 [1911], pp. 41-2) pointed out in 
denouncing ‘the profoundly erroneous truism … that we should cultivate the habit of thinking about 
what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilisation advances by extending the number 
of significant operations which we can perform without thinking about them’. The conversion of 
explicit innovations into routines which are no longer verbalised is an essential feature of 
Marshall’s theory of development, and it reappears in Nelson and Winter’s (1982) theory.  
 
Whitehead explicitly included within the scope of his proposition the operations of science 
which are intended to produce highly-codified knowledge. Scientific practice is largely tacit, and 
parts of the codebook on which each system of practice is based may have been lost, especially 
when the codebook was compiled by an earlier generation. No one can learn to be a scientist solely 
by learning scientific propositions, or even by adding to this knowledge the rules of scientific 
procedure; much of the time required to become a scientist is taken up by learning how to act 
correctly without thinking about performance – even to the point of having no accessible way of 
thinking about it. Moreover, the very process of codifying cannot dispense with tacit elements. We 
can go further. The actual generation of new ideas (whether good or bad, true or false) is necessarily 
tacit; although we may construct, as an academic exercise, a codified representation of a system in 
which all possible connections between its elements are clearly defined, nevertheless for anyone 
within an existing system, whether it be, for example, a firm, an economy, or a system of thought, 
the process of making a novel connection is necessarily tacit.  We can, as it were, give our brains 
directions to help us with a particular problem, but there is no procedure by which we can control 
precisely what they should think. What has not yet been thought cannot yet be codified. 
 
Turning tacit into codified knowledge may not be at all straightforward. Codification 
implies classification, which is always problematic. Hayek’s (1952, pp. 145-6) principle of 
necessarily selective and distorted representations allows scope for some dissonance between the 
sensory order which had been created as tacit knowledge in the course of evolution, extending 
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presumably far back before the emergence of any humanoid species, and the expressed physical 
order that claims to represent the same phenomena. That is a constructive existence proof which is 
sufficient to explain the possibility of significant differences between the orders. Adam Smith gives 
a powerful reason why this possibility should be realised; scientific principles appeal to the 
imagination, not to the practicalities which provide the selection criteria for the sensory order. 
However, even sciences may appeal to the imagination in different ways, and develop coding 
systems that encourage communication and reduce ambiguity within each group, but at the cost of 
discouraging communication and increasing ambiguity between groups. Incommensurability, in the 
literal sense of the absence of any common measure (which does not imply undiscussability), may 
be the means to advance common knowledge, and the search for a universal codebook is likely to 
be misguided, since it is likely to be highly restrictive.  
 
Underlying the whole argument is the simple idea that brains which develop selective 
connections are likely to create representations that are, in some degree, specifically appropriate to 
their contexts, and that these representations, once developed, may resist transformation. Moreover, 
all representations are selective; codified knowledge, no less than tacit knowledge, is an imposed 
order, and it necessarily simplifies, aggregates, and excludes in some respects. Even within each 
group, the possibility of developing some relevant kinds of new knowledge may be constrained by 
attempts at closure. Codification may usefully provide decision premises, and positive and negative 
heuristics, but there must be some flexibility, which means ambiguity, in interpretation. The search 
for codification may have unfortunate consequences. Official standards are almost inevitably 
defined in terms of present knowledge, and may therefore become an obstacle to innovation. The 
progressive codification of economics has not been free of opportunity costs. The first notable 
casualty was the concept of competition as a process; more recently we have seen the disappearance 
of innovative activity from the theory of growth.  
 
The desire for coherence, particularly within Popper’s World 3, which is the domain of 
codification as that is commonly understood, may close minds to the possibility of alternative ways 
of organising knowledge. That is not to decry codification; it has its own virtues, and even its own 
potential remedies for its defects. The particular constraints of coherence within a firm may prompt 
those unhappy within these constraints to create another firm; and the particular constraints of 
coherence within standard economics may prompt some defections inspired by the hope of 
something better. The example of innovative activity was not a random choice, but a connection 
especially relevant to this occasion.   
 
A Marshallian view of organisation 
 
‘Our logical methods and our endless analysis of things has often blinded us to an 
appreciation of structure and organization. Yet our physical and social worlds are full of structures, 
organizations and organisms’ (Barnard 1938, p. 317). Moreover, organisation is ‘something else 
than the sum of its parts, wherever human beings are involved’. Its effects depend on the pattern of 
connections between the parts of the organisation, precisely because what has to be organised is the 
interaction between human brains in particular contexts. It is no accident that changes in 
organisation were incorporated by Marshall (1920, p. 318) in his definition of increasing return. As 
Quéré (2003, p. 198) writes, ‘Increasing returns do not pre-exist. They are the result of an economic 
process; that is, a result of the way co-ordination problems are managed over time’. Our clearer 
understanding of the relationship between Marshall’s theory of the mind and his theory of economic 
progress may suggest that he was thinking not only of the reordering of relationships between 
people but also of the subsequent reordering of relationships within minds; at both levels the 
increasing returns are not produced by the elements but by the connections between them. (Failure 
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to recognise this basic point wreaked much havoc on economic theory in the 1920s – and continues 
to cause trouble.) As argued in the preceding presentation, the theory of the mind is an 
organisational theory; and in the brain as in the economy, organisation matters because it makes a 
difference. The difference is not always for the better, as Barnard notes: that is why he wrote about 
it and why it is still studied. However, although ‘economic organisation’ is of interest to 
economists, within the assumptions of rationality it is hard to identify any source of difference other 
than its effects on incentive compatability, and so we cannot get beyond the distinction between 
‘firms’ and ‘markets’, with no explanation of the structures which are essential to the operation of 
each.  
 
Smith’s, Marshall’s and Hayek’s psychological theories reveal both the operational 
constraints and the productive potential of human mental processes, and so provide a basis for 
examining the effects of organisational and social structures on the performance of human societies. 
Common to all is the importance of the dispersion of knowledge as the result of developmental 
processes within the brain: contrary to the usual (and natural) presumption in theories that idealise 
fully-connected systems, this is not a problem (though it gives rise to problems) but an efficient 
allocation of human cognitive capabilities through the development and effective use of 
heterogeneity. Science itself, the activity most crucially dependent on cognitive skills, is undertaken 
by a dispersed community that relies on a wide-ranging ceteris paribus clause in order to focus on 
closely-defined problems, which it attempts to reduce to repetitive patterns (Ziman 2000); and the 
enterprising business man must likewise be selective in his focus and rely on many established 
regularities in order to devise and implement new patterns. General equilibrium is not the 
appropriate concept; the growth of knowledge is always at the margin.  
 
Marshall’s recognition of this is exemplified by his ‘principle of substitution’, which is a 
guide to selective experimentation against a baseline of established practices (Loasby 1990), as in 
scientific procedures. From an orthodox perspective he appears to confuse changes of resource 
combinations within well-defined production sets to reflect changes in relative prices (the general 
equilibrium perspective) with modifications of these sets by economic agents (which in general 
equilibrium theorising is a privilege reserved to economic analysts); but if human knowledge is 
formed by the processes discussed in the previous presentation then the production possibilities 
available to any firm are partly the product of its own activities and are never well defined. This 
double insight was to become the basis of Penrose’s (1959, 1995) theory of the firm; her distinction 
between resources and productive services may be regarded as an elucidation of Marshall’s 
analysis, and the conjunction of resources and the administrative framework in her definition of the 
firm introduces a major development of it. In Penrose’s theory, firms grow because of the creation, 
selective retention and application of resources, including managerial resources; and each resource, 
instead of constituting a well-defined input into one or more production functions, is a multi-
specific asset the potential uses of which have to be discovered, invented, or imagined. 
 
In summarising the qualities required of ‘the manufacturer who makes goods not to meet 
special orders but for the general market’, Marshall links ‘ a thorough knowledge of things in his 
own trade’ with ‘the power of forecasting the broad movements of production and consumption, of 
seeing where there is an opportunity for supplying a new commodity that will meet a real want or 
improving the plan of producing an old commodity’ and also with the encouragement of ‘whatever 
enterprise and power of origination’ his employees may possess (Marshall 1920, pp. 297-8). It is 
worth noting that even Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, who make ‘new combinations’, do not, at the 
same time, seek any radical redesign of the subsystems of knowledge that they seek to recombine; 
that is also true of  Smith’s ‘philosophers and men of speculation’. Innovation requires both 
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imagination and existing procedures, which are represented by distinct levels in the ‘brain’ of 
Marshall’s ‘machine’.  
 
This sequence of creativity against a background of routines, leading to new routines which 
provide a more advanced basis for further creativity, is a dialectical process. When many people or 
many organisations pursue this sequence, their somewhat differently-organized mental structures, 
which are the product of different histories, generate a variety of products and processes to be 
winnowed by competition. Unlike biological variety, however, this economic variety is the product 
of freedom as well as chance; and the selection among this variety depends on its compatibility with 
existing patterns, and to some extent on conscious choices. The dialectics of evolution are presented 
by Marshall in his discussion of custom.  
 
If custom had been absolutely rigid, it would have been an unmixed evil.  …  However it did 
not crush out of everyone the desire to humour his own fancy, or his love of novelty, or his 
inclination to save trouble by a rather better adjustment of implements to the work done: and  
… the solidity of custom has rendered the supreme service of perpetuating any such change 
as found general approval  
Marshall 1919, p. 197 
  
This ‘limited but effective control over natural development by forecasting the future and 
preparing the way for the next step’ (Marshall 1920, p. 248) may be reasonably compared with 
Darwin’s recognition of the significant success of artificial breeding; in both, purposeful though 
fallible activities, the results of human selection, are subject to the selection processes of the wider 
environment, and the favoured activities become embodied in routines. Marshall believed that this 
process tended to result in ever greater differentiation of function, matched by closer co-ordination, 
as suggested by Herbert Spencer (Marshall 1920, p. 241). This closer co-ordination was exhibited in 
the various forms of organisation that aid the utilization and expansion of knowledge, which for 
Marshall were joint products of the human mind and the systems which it supported. That may well 
be why he suggested that organisation might be recognised, alongside land, labour, and capital, as a 
fourth factor of production (Marshall 1920, p. 139). 
 
Marshall’s treatment of organisation matches his early model of mental activity (Raffaelli 
2003). Indeed, Marshall’s discussion of organisation begins in Chapter 9 of the Principles with an 
account (corresponding to his early model) of the multi-level structure of the brain, in which 
conscious attention is reserved for problem-solving or the introduction of novelty; the application of 
solutions or the repetition of new actions ‘develops new connections between different parts of the 
brain’ (Marshall 1920, p. 252), which gradually take over the maintenance of these activities, 
leaving the conscious brain free for new initiatives, including those which utilise these now-
automatic connections. The process is illustrated by learning to skate; acquired skills no longer 
require thought, which may then be devoted to devising and controlling particular sequences of 
skating (Marshall 1920, p. 251). Order makes room for creativity, which is stabilised in a new order 
which combines newly-established expectations and beliefs into a patterned performance. 
Knowledge which may have been constructed through codification is preserved as tacit knowledge, 
and the ‘codebook’ may be lost. 
 
All this applies to organised groups of humans. Directed action within a group relies on pre-
existing routines within which no choices, in the normal sense, are exercised; if directed action fails 
to achieve its objective, the recognition of failure leads either to a modification of existing routines 
or to experimentation resulting in new routines. Thus knowledge that is already organized into 
routines facilitates the creation of new knowledge – especially that which builds on the old; and 
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new knowledge which is corroborated by apparently successful application is consolidated into new 
routines. It is not then surprising that experimentation should be at one or other of the margins of 
knowledge; and these margins will differ according to the past history of the growth of knowledge 
within each organisation, because this history influences the development of capabilities within that 
organisation and also of beliefs about these capabilities and about the ways in which they might be 
most effectively applied. The generation of variety across organisations is a natural consequence; 
and this may be considered an effective response to the underlying and pervasive uncertainty about 
the likely directions of progress. 
 
Among the difficulties that naturally arise from this conception of progress is that of finding 
an appropriate balance between order and creativity. Marshall saw this as a particular problem with 
large firms, in which routines are prime supporters of organisational coherence, and especially 
dangerous because of the valid claims that large firms could achieve greater efficiency through 
more carefully-planned and larger-scale routines: the means of achieving this efficiency may 
repress ‘elasticity and initiative’ (Marshall 1919, p. 324), and therefore the changes in mental and 
formal organisation that aid knowledge. Moreover, larger firms necessarily imply fewer firms, and 
therefore a reduction in variety. In standard economics fewer firms may reduce welfare because 
they reduce allocative efficiency; that they may reduce welfare because they reduce the range of 
experiments is not compatible with the assumptions that are necessary to sustain the standard 
analyses of rational choice equilibria. This, however, is a direct implication of Marshall’s 
theoretical system, in which economies of scale should not be confused with increasing returns, as 
is still too often done. 
 
It is perhaps because of this double threat to initiative and variety that Marshall was so 
impressed with the virtues of an industrial district, which seemed to ensure the ‘automatic 
organization’ (Marshall 1919, p. 600) of highly specialised activities while facilitating both the 
generation and the active discussion of novel ideas, including ideas for constructing new patterns of 
relationships between firms. In view of the more recent history of many British industrial districts, 
it is worth recording Marshall’s (1919, pp. 135-7) warning that a network of well-proven routines 
could impede a major reordering of productive systems, which would then be undertaken by 
newcomers. Confidently-held expectations provide the assurance to act; but this confidence may 
prevent the timely revision of those expectations. 
 
The industrial district organises most of the external knowledge on which each firm within it 
relies. But Marshall insisted that every firm required some form of external organisation: a set of 
linkages to customers, suppliers and (perhaps indirectly through trade associations and trade 
journals) to other firms in the same trade. The development of an appropriate and reliable set of 
linkages is necessarily a lengthy business (Marshall 1920, p. 500), and requires much conscious 
attention before it can be taken sufficiently for granted to provide the expectations on which both 
regular business and experimentation can be based. (Remember that the two are closely linked.) 
Atomistic competition will not suffice. As Richardson (1960) demonstrated, it will not suffice for 
equilibration, whereas Marshall’s own analysis of industrial organisation allowed him to distinguish 




It is no accident that the principles and compromises that are inherent in the use of human 
mental capabilities are to be found in the organisation of social, economic and political systems, for 
the operation of these systems entails equivalent cognitive problems, which cause us to rely on 
abstract systems of rules for the selection and classification of relevant phenomena. As De Vecchi 
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(2003) points out, Hayek used this equivalence in his later work, and advocated the dispersion of 
both political power and economic decision-making; Kirzner has pursued the theme of domain-
specific entrepreneurial alertness; and Marshall (1919, pp. 647-8), though describing the state as 
‘the most precious of human possessions’, insisted on the importance of confining it to ‘its special 
work’, and applied his cognitive model of conjectured linkages to industrial organisation (Raffaelli 
2003). Marshall recognized the connection between the management of co-ordination problems in 
the economy and the management of co-ordination problems within the brain: both require 
combinations of routines and novelty, and these combinations are themselves modified by 
evolutionary processes of trial and error. 
 
Productive organisations are knowledge communities, and all knowledge communities 
require shared assumptions (which remain problematic). The perpetual questioning of assumptions 
paralyses action while the avoidance of all questioning may lead to disaster, and among the key 
questions for any economy are how much and what kind of variation should be encouraged and 
where should it be encouraged. Underlying all this is Potts’ (2000, p. 80) question, which has also 
been Simon’s question: ‘how do we, both as individuals and collectives, make good choices of the 
connections that build systems?’ 
 
In the end, there is no escape from Knightian uncertainty; no procedures for expanding 
either theoretical knowledge or practical skills can be proved to be correct in relation to the total 
system to which they are to be applied, because our best representations of this system are 
necessarily incomplete, and likely to be erroneous in some unrecognised respects. However, 
Knightian uncertainty is also a precondition for novelty, as Shackle kept reminding us; and human 
cognitive systems have a distinct, if limited, capacity for creating novelty as an integral part of their 
cognitive operations. They may well also have a genetically-based need to search for novelty, and 
so a degree of uncertainty (balanced with some perceived stability) may be a necessity for the 
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Prof. Loasby’s papers aim to lay down meaningful – and much needed- micro foundations to recent 
research on the dynamics of innovating organisations. Such foundations are developed building 
upon two rather different streams of research. On the one side, Professor Loasby analyses key 
contributions of early classical economists such as Smith and Cattaneo, which are then linked to 
subsequent work by Marshall and Hayek. On the other side, recent work in neuropsychology is also 
relied on to develop the analysis. The first paper (The Psychology of Wealth) focuses on the 
individual as the level of analysis. The second paper (Organisation and the Human Mind) extends 
the analysis to the organisational level. In this brief note, I will not to summarise the argument 
developed in the papers, or present a thorough theoretical critique. I will merely try, consistently I 
hope with the epistemological stance on which these papers are developed, to highlight those 
aspects that in my view lend themselves to empirical exploration. In so doing, I will identify a few 
links between these papers and recent developments in the innovation management and 
organisational sociology literatures.   
 
Together, these two path breaking papers provide a first, integrated account of how humans in 
organisations solve complex problems. This, I believe, is the key contribution of these two papers: 
approaching the study of organisations not as institutions that align individual incentives, but as 
devices that support and enhance the problem solving efforts of individual agents. Consistently, 
Professor Loasby’s papers build upon the idea that economic agents are not (only) optimisers of 
their own utility, but problem solvers that look for –and establish- regularities in uncertain 
environments. Besides, problem solving activities are not conceptualised as symbol processing 
algorithms, but in terms of pattern-making and pattern-using skills.  In many ways, the cognitive 
processes discussed in these papers are closer to Weick’s ‘sense making’ activities than to Simon’s 
‘problem solving’ algorithms. In this context, the key ‘economic’ problem that agents need to solve 
is not that of scarcity of resources to be allocated among competitive uses. Rather, Professor 
Loasby’s agents are engaged in a restless effort of making sense of a changing environment. 
Scarcity (of physical and cognitive resources) becomes a learning opportunity, more than an 
economic constraint.  
The reference above to Weick’s (1995) work on sense making is a reminder of the fact that, while 
economists may have forgotten some of the early contributions of Smith and Cattaneo, and tend to 
ignore recent developments in psychology, other branches of the social sciences have developed 
along lines which are quite consistent with the approach proposed here by Professor Loasby. 
Making a link between these contribution and the present papers may provide a head start toward 
the development of propositions and hypotheses amenable of empirical testing.  
Indeed, the body of theory developed in these papers does provide useful guidance to empirically 
minded researchers in two related –although so far disconnected- areas. Both areas touch upon the 
link between human cognition and the organisation of economic activities. First of all, there is a 
nowadays enormous body of literature that looks at the evolution of networks in various 
environmental contexts. Originated within the sociological analysis of organisations (e.g. Powell, 
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1990), this methodology of analysis is nowadays increasingly common also within the so called 
‘innovation studies’ community. Much of this literature tends to emphasise the competitive 
advantages that stem from being ‘central’ within ‘dense’ networks. The often accepted hidden 
assumption is that connectivity is ‘good’, as it provides opportunities to learn from a variety of 
sources. Prof. Loasby’s work cautions against this assumption. Solving problems is a process of 
identification of the relationship that matters the most, not of maximising the connections between 
each node in the system. Up to a point, recent research on modularity does provide an empirical 
counterpart to Prof. Loasby’s theoretical pieces, as this literature stresses the need to design 
products and organisations in a way that minimise the links between self contained modules (e.g. 
Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Prof. Loasby’s work emphasise the need to shift from the analysis of 
given ‘design rules’ (ibid.), that embody a specific pattern of connections among modules, to the 
analysis of the dynamics of design rules. Key to such an activity is the ability to establish new 
patterns of connections between new and existing nodes. How this happens, and what are the 
drivers of this type of search activities remain largely unexplored in the modularity literature. 
Professor Loasby’s papers provide useful insights, particularly in terms of the understanding of the 
human motivations that underpin the search for new combinations.  
 
Second, once the most important links are identified through an effort of pattern making, issues 
arise about how coordination is achieved among agents, communities and organisations that are 
only weakly connected. Here, a useful bridge could be built toward the organisational literature that 
looks at the interaction of communities of specialised agents. Traditionally, economists look at the 
market place as ‘the’ place where interactions happen. As discussed in Organisation and the Human 
Mind, market-based processes of coordination occur in ‘integral space’, that is to say, all nodes 
have to be connected to every other node. The weaknesses of such systems are thoroughly discussed 
in the paper. Alternatives to markets as coordination devices exist. Professor Loasby discusses at 
length the role played by organisations. However, there is no reason to believe that organisations, 
within their boundaries, should be ‘integral’ (in the sense discussed in the papers). Quite the 
opposite, the very essence of organisational design is about drawing lines and borders at the 
functional level, at the process level, etc. In this respect, research on boundary objects (e.g. Star, 
1980) emphasises the possibility to develop artefacts that allow heterogeneous communities to 
interact, while maintaining very independent, and even irreconcilable, identities. Virtual prototypes 
provide an example of boundary object that allow groups to interact while maintaining high 
cognitive and behavioural dissonance (D’Adderio, 2004). This line of research can be used to 
operationalised some of the concepts developed in Professor Loasby’s papers.  
 
In this respect, the discussion about the development of physical and sensory orders is of great 
interest, and of paramount empirical relevance. Classification systems are in fact the invisible 
architecture of any information system or, to use Bowker and Star’s (1999) words, ‘the scaffolding 
of information infrastructures’. Very little, and in economics nothing at all, is known about how 
individuals develop their own classification systems, and how different classificatory systems 
interact and compete to form higher level systems. Professor Loasby’s papers highlight the fact that 
we need to understand more about how business firms, for example, develop their accountancy 
systems if we want to be able to make sense of these organisations and of the cognitive processes 
that underlie their inner workings. More precisely, the interplay of different classification systems 
within the same organisation can help shed light on the process through which inconsistencies and 
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